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The U.S. military cooperates more with the Colombian military than the Mexican 
military in combating drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. This thesis analyzes 
the international relations theories of liberalism, realism, and constructivism to help 
explain why. Historical relationships matter in cooperation. Mexican and U.S. military 
units waged war to defend and take territory from one another. Mexico passed a 
constitution banning a garrison of foreign military units within Mexico, leading to low 
cooperation. The Colombian and U.S. militaries defended the Panama Canal during 
World War II to keep the shipping lanes open, and Colombia allows a garrison of U.S. 
military personnel in Colombia, leading to greater cooperation. Realism best explains 
reasons for when and why these two countries cooperate with the United States. 
Cooperation exists when there are shared external security concerns by the two countries. 
Cooperation exists when the internal instability of one country creates a reliance on 
another country. Cooperation remains low when there is no common external security 
threat, when one state perceives the other as a threat, or when a country can control 
internal stability on its own. Further cooperation with Mexico will depend on U.S. 
military leaders’ willingness to empathize with Mexicans about past U.S. military 
interventions. Further cooperation with Colombia will require continued military-to-
military relationships to form, followed by agreements to solidify those relationships. 
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On March 10, 2016, Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, United States Southern 
Command (SOUTHCOM), provided a statement to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. Admiral Tidd stated, “we work with our partners to defend the southern 
approaches to the United States, respond to regional contingencies, and promote security 
cooperation with the 31 nations and 16 areas of special sovereignty in our Area of 
Responsibility (AOR).”1 Admiral William E. Gortney, Commander, United States 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), told the Senate Armed Services committee “we are 
inextricably linked with our partners through geography, economics, and demographics, 
and conduct deliberate security cooperation with them to strengthen our defense in depth 
and advance our mutual security interests.”2 To combat drug trafficking, cooperation 
between countries is vital. However, what explains why two countries cooperate with 
each other? According to Admiral Tidd, Colombia, located in the SOUTHCOM AOR, is 
“a strategic ally, friend, and preeminent partner” that has experienced years of bilateral 
cooperation with the United States.3 Mexico, located in the NORTHCOM AOR, is a 
border country and has only more recently started cooperating bilaterally with the United 
States. What explains the variation in both timing and substance between U.S. military 
and Colombian military cooperation, and U.S. military and Mexican military cooperation 
to combat drug trafficking?  
This research project will investigate the topic utilizing scholarly articles debating 
different international relations theories that lead to cooperation. Additionally, it will 
analyze the historical military relationships, economic ties, and political institutions that 
join these countries together to combat drug trafficking. This thesis is not about whether 
                                                 
1 United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt Tidd, 
Commander, United States Southern Command, United States Senate, 114th Congress (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2016). 
2 United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Posture Statement of Admiral William E. 
Gortney, Commander, United States Northern Command, United States Senate, 114th Congress 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2016). 
3 United States Senate, Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt Tidd. 
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NORTHCOM or SOUTHCOM is doing a better job in cooperating with each country. 
Instead, this thesis will outline the reasons why countries cooperate and apply this 
analytical framework to understand the variation in cooperation to combat drug 
traffickers in the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Colombia cases. 
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and the drug trade emanating from Latin 
America impact the U.S. security posture along the southern border and international 
security stability throughout Central and South America. All three countries in this case 
study can likely agree that external security threats to national sovereignty, economic 
interests that benefits each country, and internal instability would require cooperation 
from one another. 
Strong, cooperative international relationships are essential to combat drug 
trafficking. This research is significant to at least two groups: Foreign policy decision-
makers and the U.S. military, since, more than ever, our military answers the call to 
interact and build partner capacity with other nations. After the Japanese bombed Pearl 
Harbor, the Colombian military reached out to the United States and offered designated 
locations within the country to house seaplanes to attack Axis powers.4 Specific events 
like this have led Bradley Coleman to argue, “World War II and the Cold War 
transformed U.S.-Colombian security relations.”5 The United States and Colombian 
militaries still maintain a strong working relationship today. U.S. military personnel 
frequently use Colombian military bases and train Colombian counterparts in Colombia. 
Mexico and the United States fought against one another in the Mexican-American War, 
likely generating bad historical relationships between the two. Although Mexico did 
support the Allies during WWII, and assisted the United States with creating factories in 
country to support the war effort, the Mexican Constitution prevents a garrison of foreign 
military units. 
                                                 
4 Cesar A. Vasquez, “A History of the United States Caribbean Defense Command (1941-1947)” 
(Dissertation, Florida International University, 2016), 4, 
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2458/?utm_source=digitalcommons.fiu.edu%2Fetd%2F2458&utm_medi
um=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages. 
5 Bradley Coleman, Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 
1939–1960 (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2008), xiii. 
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The U.S. military will find the comparative case study approach underpinning this 
thesis important because Colombia is in the SOUTHCOM AOR and Mexico is in the 
NORTHCOM AOR. SOUTHCOM’s self-proclaimed mission is to “support U.S. national 
security objectives and interagency efforts that promote regional security cooperation” 
and carry out operations to stop drug trafficking.6 NORTHCOM has a mission to 
“defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.”7 U.S. military personnel 
frequently conduct exercises with countries like Colombia and Mexico. Admiral Tidd, 
Commander of SOUTHCOM, reported that Operation MARTILLO has been a successful 
operation since January 15, 2012. Operation MARTILLO is a multinational operation 
involving Colombia, the United States, and 12 other countries, stopping transnational 
organizations from smuggling illicit cargo through Central America. To date, Operation 
MARTILLO has led to the “disruption of 595 metric tons of cocaine, the seizure of $25.8 
million in bulk cash, and the seizure of 1486 detainees and 478 vessels and aircraft.”8 
Admiral Gortney reported that relations between the U.S. and Mexican militaries 
improved dramatically in 2015 and stated, “in 2015 alone, I personally met with top 
military leaders of Mexico on eight separate occasions to strengthen our relationships and 
enhance our coordination.”9 With the constant exercises occurring in the region between 
Colombian and U.S. militaries, and the continued dialogue taking place between the 
Mexican and U.S. government officials, military personnel need to understand the 
importance of U.S.-Colombian cooperation and U.S.-Mexican cooperation. 
Foreign policy decision-makers will find this research important because they 
appropriate the money and establish institutions that lead to cooperation. In 2000, the 
U.S. government enacted a diplomatic initiative with Colombia, called Plan Colombia, 
which would provide military assistance and aid to the Colombian military to combat 
drug cartels. The appropriated funds totaled approximately $10 billion. In 2008, Congress 
                                                 
6 United States Southern Command, Department of Defense, last modified October 7, 2010, 
http://www.southcom.mil/Pages/Default.aspx. 
 7 United States Northern Command, Department of Defense, last modified December 21, 2015, 
http://www.northcom.mil/. 
8 United States Senate, Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt Tidd. 
9 United States Senate, Posture Statement of Admiral William E. Gortney. 
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approved a bilateral security cooperation agreement with Mexico, called the Mérida 
Initiative. Since the agreement signing, Congress appropriated almost $2.8 billion to help 
Mexico stop TOC, create rule of law, secure the shared border, and build strong 
community foundations.10 In FY2017, the U.S. government plans to provide Mexico with 
$134 million and Colombia with $391 million in foreign assistance aid.11 Better 
understanding of the U.S. government’s role in financial support and institution building 
in Latin America could lead to increases or decreases in financial assistance or treaties 
based on mission success or failure in cooperation efforts. This research could generate 
future foreign policy decisions in other parts of the globe, based again on those mission 
successes or failures. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis draws on three international relations (IR) theories that attempt to 
define cooperation between two states within the international system. These three 
theories are realism, liberalism, and constructivism. While scholars of all three schools 
present different theories and arguments for the ease and likelihood of cooperation, they 
all agree that cooperation can exist and is fundamental in international relations.12 
This literature review starts with the proponents of realism as it relates to 
cooperation and looks at why states maximize their security by cooperating with other 
states in an anarchic system. Then, this review will look at the liberal view of cooperation 
by examining what it means to lead meaningful cooperation to promote positive change. 
Finally, this review will touch on the constructivist argument, where states can cooperate 
with each other but they may disagree, depending on the social relationship, which could 
cause conflict between those states. 
                                                 
10 Clare R. Seelke and Kristin Finklea, “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative 
and Beyond,” Congressional Research Service, August 16, 2010, 1. 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a528272.pdf. 
11 Foreign Assistance, Department of State, last modified June 9, 2016, 
http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/. 
12 David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York, NY: 
Colombia University Press, 1993), 5. 
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1. Cooperation and Realism 
Proponents of realism argue that anarchy drives the international system and 
states are primary contributors and receivers of that force. Anarchy creates competition 
between states and “inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common 
interests.”13 Two leading debates under realism today try to explain cooperation between 
states. Hans Morgenthau, Thomas Hobbes, and Reinhold Niebuhr argue that human 
nature dictates how states regard cooperation and that states constantly struggle for 
power. Morgenthau created six principles of political realism to support his argument. To 
summarize those six principles, all states want to achieve the best outcome for 
themselves, but there are limits on those actions by reasonable thinking, universal law, 
and interests defined by power. Attaining cooperation occurs when these actions align 
with what each country is trying to achieve. It is reasonable to think that the drug trade is 
bad for any country, human rights abuses by drug traffickers go against universal law, 
and an interest in stopping the drug trade is a common goal. 
Kenneth Waltz argues that states in an anarchic structure compete with each other 
to survive and cooperation is difficult under anarchy. Waltz further explains that 
cooperation can be a dangerous choice for some because states seek to maximize relative 
gains and to avoid dependency. 
Charles Glaser argues, “structural realism properly understood predicts that, under 
a wide range of conditions, adversaries can best achieve their security goals through 
cooperative policies, not competitive ones, and should, therefore choose cooperation 
when these conditions prevail.”14 Countering liberal arguments that argue structural 
realism promotes competition, Glaser attempts to support his argument by analyzing a 
state’s military-policy when at peace and comparing it to an arms race.15 Glaser suggests 
                                                 
13 Shameem Ahmad Mir, “Realism, Anarchy and Cooperation,” International Journal of 
Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies 1, no. 8 (2014): 165, 
http://imsear.li.mahidol.ac.th/bitstream/123456789/176169/1/ijims2014v1n8p164.pdf. 
14 Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, no. 3 
(1995): 51, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539079. 
15  Ibid., 51. 
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cooperation, in a structural realism setting, refers to a set of policies, or institutions, 
created by two states to prevent an arms race between the two countries, while 
competition would see military buildup unilaterally.16 Creating institutions to achieve 
cooperation could occur within Glaser’s reasoning. 
2. Cooperation and Liberalism 
Two leading debates under liberalism today try to explain why cooperation occurs 
between states. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane argue, “achieving cooperation is 
difficult in world politics. There is no common government to enforce rules, and by the 
standards of domestic society, international institutions are weak.”17 States will need to 
work together, settle differences, and cooperate for the common good of the two states. 
Even though the international system may be anarchic in structure, proponents of neo-
liberalism believe cooperation is difficult, but not impossible. Axelrod and Keohane 
further argue, “cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or 
anticipated preferences of others.”18 Accordingly, institutions are crucial for enhancing 
the possibility of cooperation through coordination. 
Helen Milner sides with Keohane’s definition of cooperation as “actors adjust 
their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of 
policy coordination.”19 Accordingly, Milner argues, “policy coordination, in turn, implies 
that the policies of the two states have been adjusted to reduce their negative 
consequences for the other states.”20 These arguments assume that states behave because 
they want to achieve an expected goal and desire some type of reward for coordinating 
policy change to cooperation.21 For example, the United States would cooperate with 
                                                 
16 Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 51. 
17 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 226, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010357. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” 
World Politics 44, no. 3 (1992): 467, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010546. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 468. 
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Mexico because the desired goal for the United States is stopping illegal drugs from 
entering the United States southern border. Mexico would likely cooperate because 
Mexico’s goals could be achieving more training from the United States and more 
economic assistance in the form of foreign aid. 
Bruce Russett argues that democratic states like the United States will not attack 
or act violently toward similar governments and will likely achieve cooperation because 
of state norms and goals. Since democratic states share similar norms and goals, states 
could achieve a peaceful resolution to existing problems through cooperation. Russett 
further argues that democratic states, tied together by a common set of institutions, will 
cross national boundaries.22 Transnational linkages and institutions, like individuals, 
private entities, and government organizations, create “individual autonomy and 
pluralism.”23 The United States, Mexico, and Colombia share common internal 
institutions as democratic governments as well as treaties established between the 
countries, like Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative. This argument should prove that 
common norms could facilitate cooperation between these states to some extent. 
3. Cooperation and Constructivism 
Alexander Wendt argues that states can cooperate with each other but can also 
disagree, depending on the social relationship between said states. Wendt defines 
constructivist social theory thus: “people act toward objects, including other actors, on 
the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.”24 The United States and 
Colombia will interact differently toward each other, compared to the United States and 
North Korea, and likely cooperate because they perceive each other as friends. The 
United States and North Korea perceive each other as enemies and will likely have 
limited cooperation.  
                                                 
22 Bruce Russett, “The Fact of Democratic Peace,” In Debating the Democratic Peace, ed. Michael E. 
Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1996), 85. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organizations 46, no. 2 (1992): 396–397, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858. 
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Proponents of constructivism argue to move past rationalism and suggest that 
state preferences and identities are not set in stone nor formed from external factors. 
Instead, these preferences and identities form internally due to external interaction and 
can adapt to change over a given timeframe through social interaction. For instance, 
while the United States and Mexico may have had limited cooperation in the past due to 
historical relationships, the two countries have shown drastic changes in preferences and 
identities in cooperation over the last few years as their goals align. 
Ganjar Nugroho argues, “it is a complex world where many factors are 
interrelated and affect each other. Material structure, international social structures, and 
domestic politics, all together construct the world’s politics and economy, and construct 
relations among states.”25 Nugroho points out that state-to-state identity building and 
developing a social relationship to understand a state are keys to cooperation. States may 
cheat in the international system, but if a state seeking cooperation can predict a partner 
state may cheat, the state wanting to cheat may reconsider to keep its good reputation in 
the international arena.26 For example, if the United States and Mexico signed a treaty to 
provide foreign aid to Mexico to combat the drug trade, and Mexico failed to live up to 
its end of the deal, the international community may not work with Mexico in the future 
against drug trafficking because Mexico had not acted on good faith in past cooperation 
efforts. 
B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis looks at two independent variables, security and internal instability, to 
help determine what causes the change in the dependent variable, cooperation. The three 
possible explanations that best explain cooperation in international relations are realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism. Each theory is testable by looking at the reasons why 
cooperation has existed since the early 1900s between the U.S. and Colombian militaries, 
and the late 1800s between the U.S. and Mexican militaries.  
                                                 
25 Ganjar Nugroho, “Constructivism and International Relations Theories,” Global and Strategies 2, 
no. 1 (2008): 95, http://journal.unair.ac.id/filerPDF/6%20constructivism-final%20edit%20OK.pdf. 
26 Ibid., 93. 
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1. Realist Hypothesis 
Realists would argue that a state would cooperate with a hegemonic state if it 
feels its choice to cooperate would lead to its own national security and is content with 
the status quo of the hegemonic states’ powerful influence in the region. The United 
States benefits when it cooperates with other countries in Latin America and assists those 
countries to become independent enough to handle their own internal security issues. 
That cooperation is achievable depending on the security situation and power struggle in 
the region viewed by each country. External threats to the two countries have led to 
cooperation in the past, like the common defense of the Panama Canal during World War 
II. The United States has never invaded Colombia or infringed on Colombian 
sovereignty, but formally recognized Panama becoming an independent state from the 
break-up of Gran Colombia in 1903. The United States is a hegemon in the Western 
Hemisphere and likely pressures other countries, like Colombia, into cooperation. The 
United States routinely advises the Colombian military on combating drug trafficking and 
internal security issues. Colombia, in public, trusts the intentions of the United States 
when the U.S. military operates in Colombia. The United States has taken land from 
Mexico in the past. Mexico could be warming up to the idea that cooperation with U.S. 
military assets may be in its best interests today because they share a common enemy in 
combating drug traffickers. Historically, Mexico has been hesitant because of its own 
security and sovereignty concerns that the United States may have a larger agenda for 
Mexico than just partnering to combat drug trafficking. This has led to lower cooperation 
between Mexico and the United States. 
H1: A Realist hypothesis correlates with the security of a state from external 
threats. States will cooperate with each other when they share their external security 
concerns. 
2. Liberal Hypothesis 
Proponents of liberalism would argue that a state would cooperate with another 
state when stronger formal or informal institutions are established. The liberal hypothesis 
falls under the international relations theory of liberalism. Plan Colombia (United States 
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and Colombia) and The Mérida Initiative (United States and Mexico) are two treaties 
signed by these respective governments with a common goal: to combat drug trafficking. 
However, those documents present very different ways to achieve that goal and could be 
further researched to show the differences in the institutions it creates. Corruption from 
within Mexico and the FARC contributing to internal instability within Colombia leads to 
weak formal institutions. This could also create a situation where strong informal 
institutions arise. Governments need initiatives to root out corruption at all levels of 
government to ensure criminal organizations are not influencing military and police units. 
Treaties and rules have no teeth if corrupt leaders do not follow or abide by them. Formal 
and informal institutions exist in the two countries. If certain governmental institutions 
are unwilling or inadequate to cooperate with the international community, informal 
institutions will need to be set up to continue combating drug traffickers and established 
organizations like the FARC. 
H2: The liberal hypothesis correlates with internal instability. States will 
cooperate with each other when internal instability extends beyond a state’s capacity to 
handle such activities using established formal and informal institutions. Internal 
instability could arise from economic, political, or security concerns. 
3. Constructivist Hypothesis 
Constructivists would argue that a state would cooperate with another state when 
good social relationships, both historical and current, are established. This hypothesis 
falls in line with the international relations theory of constructivism. The United States 
and Colombia have shared a military past for many years and “embodied the Inter-
American cooperation.”27 The United States and Mexico were involved in an armed 
conflict during the 1840s. War of this kind may contribute to a hesitation in cooperation 
with some military branches over time. Current military relationships show some signs of 
cooperation, but Colombia allows the U.S. military to station advisors in its country, 
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whereas Mexico does not, except for defense attaches. In addition, Colombia participates 
in more international military exercises with the United States than does Mexico. 
H3: Constructivism correlates with shared social relationships, how the world 
shaped human action, and their identities on the world stage. Cooperation exists when 
human identities and interests align with one another. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design uses the structured, focused comparison method. Alexander 
George and Andrew Bennett argue that, “the method is structured in that the researcher 
writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are 
asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making 
systematic comparison and accumulation of the findings of the cases possible.”28 
Research on U.S. military and Mexican military cooperation and U.S. military and 
Colombian military cooperation will occur with regard to historical relationships, 
international training and aid, and institutions so that the structure and focus applies 
equally to each case study.29 
The United States, Colombia, and Mexico are good case studies, referred to by 
Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune in their book The Logic of Comparative Social 
Inquiry as, “the most similar systems design.”30 Przeworski and Teune suggest that this 
type of study is “based on the belief that systems as similar as possible with respect to as 
many features as possible constitute the optimal samples for comparative inquiry.”31 The 
three countries selected all share common security, economic, and political 
characteristics. Przeworski and Teune then predict, “if some important differences are 
found among these otherwise similar countries, then the number of factors attributable to 
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these differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms of those 
differences alone.”32 
This research aims to establish the importance of various independent variables, 
like the U.S. military relationship with the Colombian military or the frequency of 
international training the two countries receive to combat the drug trade, in formulating 
outcomes.33 The variables I will research and analyze are the historical relationships 
between the military branches; the international training, aid, and support countries 
receive; and the formal and informal institutions established in each country. Examining 
the social and historical relationships between the military branches will occur by looking 
at U.S. military leaders and their relationships with their counterparts. Researching 
formal and informal institutions established in Colombia and Mexico will occur to see if 
treaties, rules, governments, foreign aid, and other programs contribute to successful 
cooperation as well as international training the Colombians and Mexicans receive from 
foreign military or law enforcement units. Finally, assessing competition between the 
countries, if any, will occur to see if Colombia and Mexico compete with each other to 
receive United States assistance, or if competition between the two states and the United 
States occur in the form of economic or military power that could hinder cooperation. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis will draw on research from historical military relationships and 
cooperation efforts between the U.S. and Colombian militaries since the early 1900s 
because the two militaries did not cooperate with each other prior to this point in time. 
Additionally, research will include the Mexican military and U.S. military relationship, 
and cooperation efforts since the late 1800s, reviewing why the two militaries did not 
cooperate until WWII. These timeframes are important because the two countries 
experienced different reasons for cooperation and set up different formal and informal 
institutions to structure those cooperation efforts. Nevertheless, they look similar on 
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paper as just two Latin American countries influenced by United States’ policies with 
common external security interests. 
For the international relations theory portion of this thesis, I will lean heavily on 
leading scholars in the fields of constructivism, liberalism, and realism as they relate to 
international cooperation. For historical and recent cooperation efforts between the 
countries, I will use secondary scholarly sources from authors considered experts in their 
field of study, producing books on military cooperation efforts between the United States 
and Latin American countries, and articles relevant to cooperation in the Western 
Hemisphere. Finally, I will use primary sources from archived newspapers to strengthen 
the academic sources. 
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II. EVALUATING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND MEXICAN MILITARIES  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. and Mexican militaries did not cooperate from the 1800s to World War 
II because each of the two countries viewed its sovereign territory differently, resulting in 
conflict. With the United States expanding west and increasing its military might by the 
day, fighting between the two militaries occurred over territorial disputes and perceived 
border violations. U.S. military and Mexican military cooperation began to form during 
World War II when Axis powers attacked civilian shipping vessels from both countries, 
driving a common interest at the government level to form cooperation efforts between 
their militaries. U.S. military and Mexican military cooperation in the battlefield on 
foreign territory, like World War II combat operations with Mexican air forces in the 
Philippines, started this military relationship. 
After World War II and through the United States’ war on drugs policy, the two 
countries cooperated in training evolutions aimed at strengthening the tactics, techniques, 
and procedures that the Mexican Army and Navy would need to combat the growing 
threat of guerilla warfare and internal security unrest from drug cultivation and trade. 
When Mexican military units engaged in counter-drug operations, U.S. military units 
were in a standoff status, advising and assisting as needed, or training Mexican forces 
prior to their executed operations. 
After 9/11, cooperation continued to rise, with Mexican Navy and U.S. Navy 
units participating in international maritime exercises and Mexican Army units training 
with U.S. Special Operation forces in the United States to better combat drug cartels and 
TOCs, and to reduce internal security issues alongside their civilian law enforcement 
counterparts. Most cooperation efforts between the two militaries occur in an academic 
classroom or at training facilities in the United States. An increase over the years in the 
number of Mexican military students attending service-level institutions, such as 
uniformed service graduate schools in the United States, is also encouraging because it 
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builds individual relationships with U.S. counterparts that could foster cooperation efforts 
in the future. 
Within the last five years, there have been more joint security exercises and 
training evolutions among Mexico, Canada, and the United States on land, sea, and air 
than at any time in history. Mexican military officials are taking more of a lead role in 
some of these exercises, and their cooperation with the U.S. military continues to heal the 
metaphorical mental scars from remembered historical grievances. 
This chapter analyzes major events that took place from the 1800s to present day 
between the Mexican and U.S. militaries. It further answers the question: what explains 
the variation in both timing and substance in cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico? I 
argue, in tune with realist perspectives, that cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican 
militaries occur when the two countries look out for their own external security interests, 
but cooperate when mutually beneficial. This distinction matters because realism also 
explains why the two countries fought each other in the 1800s. Mexico, a smaller state in 
the region, is content with the United States, a hegemonic power, looking out for its own 
national security interests in drug trafficking. However, Mexico’s focus on mutually 
beneficial cooperation changes when the United States violates its sovereignty. 
Historically, cooperation between the two countries has been low because they were a 
threat to each other under anarchy. Recent mutual benefits in security and economic 
interests have been the driving force to increase cooperation.  The two countries need to 
move forward from historical differences and cooperate to challenge domestic and 
international security threats at the military level. While liberalism could explain recent 
gains in cooperation because of the formal institutions set in place, or constructivism 
because recent social relationships have fostered cooperation, realism still best explains 
individual states living in an anarchic world. Cooperation between the two countries will 
occur when the two countries face a security threat from drug trafficking or other external 
factor. However, Mexico will still be hesitant in its current and future relationship with 
the U.S. military, given their historical conflict. 
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B. PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II 
The United States and Mexico experienced conflict after conflict during the 1800s 
and early 1900s. The United States was more interested in expansion west and land grabs 
as opposed to bilateral cooperation with Mexico. In the late 1800s, the U.S. government 
turned to its military forces, both Navy and Army, to fend off Mexican military units and 
Mexican citizens harassing U.S. citizens. Due to the historical battles with the United 
States, Mexican military officers attending Mexican institutions as part of their formal 
training learn “a professional culture that embodies myths and legends of Mexican 
military heroes defending against invasions from the north.”34 Mexicans learn that the 
U.S. military will encroach on their sovereign territory and should not be trusted. 
From 1836 to 1917, the U.S. military and the Mexican military engaged each 
other on the battlefield resulting in death, destruction, and occupation, and historical 
records indicate that the U.S. military intervened in Mexico on eleven separate 
occasions.35 The United States declared war on Mexico in 1846 because former President 
James Polk felt Mexico had invaded U.S. territory, territory Mexico still claimed as its 
own. In 1847, at the Battle of Buena Vista, U.S. military forces clashed with Mexican 
General Santa Anna and his army. The battle occurred in large part because Mexico had 
lost the territory of Texas and was soon to lose larger chunks of land in New Mexico and 
California. The United States sent military forces, led by U.S. Army General Winfield 
Scott, to Mexico City, where they remained for approximately 18 months. In 1848, the 
two countries signed a treaty to end hostile activities and the U.S. military returned home. 
Mexico lost over half of its land to the north, approximately 525,000 square miles.36 
Mexicans still remember this event in Mexican military history, which likely supports 
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skepticism within the Mexican Army about any U.S. military objectives toward 
Mexico.37  
Battles between the two countries also occurred along the coastline, with the U.S. 
Navy engaging enemy positions. In 1914, the U.S. Navy sailed to Veracruz, Mexico, and 
anchored in the harbor until the end of the year in response to the Tampico Affair, a small 
incident resulting in the arrest of nine U.S. sailors by Mexican authorities in Tampico, 
Mexico. 
The United States perceived the incursions across the border as justified. In 1916, 
Army General Pershing crossed the U.S./Mexico border into Northern Mexico with 
10,000+ troops. General Pershing was chasing Pancho Villa for disturbing U.S. citizens 
in the New Mexico territory. Turbiville argues that Pershing’s “expedition deep into 
Mexico’s Chihuahua State in retaliation for Pancho Villa’s raid on Columbus, New 
Mexico was an especially notable consequence of the Mexican Revolution.”38 These 
punitive actions lasted until 1917. In 1919, the incursions across the border continued 
when the U.S. Army attacked the Mexican sovereign territory of Juarez, Mexico. The 
Mexican Army was in the middle of fighting with Pancho Villa supporters within the 
city. U.S. military forces crossed the border and, through “haphazard and unsanctioned 
cooperation with Mexican federal troops,” waged war with the Mexican rebels.39 
In 1917, Mexico adopted a new constitution that would identify restrictions on its 
own military and its relationship with foreign militaries. This constitution laid out a few 
stringent military requirements. First, the Mexican military cannot sign an alliance with 
anyone, although, during World War II, there was an exception made to this provision. 
Second, Mexican military units are not allowed to participate in peacekeeping efforts 
abroad. Third, the Mexican military would need senate approval to conduct military 
operations with foreign militaries. Finally, foreign military troops cannot garrison in 
Mexican territory unless congress approves. Laws exist that also prevent U.S. military 
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units from freely entering Mexico. The Mérida Initiative is one such law that does not 
specify U.S. military personnel shall reside in Mexico and it is likely that Mexico made 
this point when drafting this initiative because of past concerns with national sovereignty. 
Prior to World War II, Mexico and the United States failed to cooperate because 
the two countries were trying to survive in an anarchic world with their own states being 
the priority. Proponents of realism can likely explain why the two countries protected 
their sovereignty and rights as a nation. They were looking out for their own security 
interests during this time and had no reason to cooperate. In effect, each was insecure 
about its respective neighboring state. Mexico was trying to hold onto its territories to the 
north and the United States wanted to expand and bring in those territories. The Mexican 
and U.S. governments used their militaries to push civilian objectives and pursue their 
own national interests. This ultimately led to war on the battlefield between the two 
militaries, with some occurring deep into Mexico. The power struggle that defined the 
border between the two countries continued until World War II. 
World War II would provide the two countries with opportunities to cooperate. At 
first, Mexico tried to remain neutral and benefit economically from both the Allies and 
Axis powers by selling oil to anyone willing to buy it. Mexico extended an olive branch 
to the United States when it realized its neighbor to the north needed its assistance in the 
war. Mexico offered its military bases to house U.S. troops and the Mexican Airforce 
flew combat sorties against the Japanese in the Philippines. Mexico was a country that 
likely wanted world recognition as a team player in international relations. It helped the 
allies win the war by cooperating with the United States to defeat a common world threat, 
the axis powers. While national sovereignty was not in immediate danger from Japan or 
Germany, economic threats were likely forming. 
C. WORLD WAR II TO THE WAR ON DRUGS 
During World War II, warmer relations between the United States and Mexico 
signaled a possible open door to military cooperation between the two countries. Just 
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, United States President Franklin Roosevelt took 
action to strengthen U.S. borders and coastlines. However, his vision of a secure border 
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to the south extended well past U.S. sovereign territory and extended into the Panama 
Canal region.40 Roosevelt also knew he needed allies in the Western Hemisphere to fight 
the European Axis of power in the Atlantic. Roosevelt sought out countries that could 
provide economic resources like oil, sugar, and other food commodities, and forward 
bases and forces to help in the fight. 
Mexico provided both of these to its neighbors to the north. Mexican President 
Lazaro Cardenas allowed the U.S. military to use Mexico’s military bases to house troops 
should the need arise.41 U.S. military officials knew that the presence of U.S. forces in 
Mexico would be a touchy subject for their Mexican counterparts. Therefore, wording in 
documents and other transactions had to make sure that “occupation” was not included in 
the verbiage. Instead of possibly housing U.S. military forces in Mexican territory, the 
U.S. government proposed the idea to “provide the means for Mexico to insure her ability 
to defend herself against any probable attack from overseas and against internal disorder, 
until U.S.-armed aid can arrive in sufficient force to insure success.”42 However, German 
documents found toward the end of the war suggested the Cardenas administration 
“passively supported Germany both by allowing the export of strategic raw materials and 
by turning a blind eye to the activities of German intelligence agents based in Mexico.”43 
U.S. officials knew that Germany was conducting a propaganda campaign in Mexico to 
thwart Mexico-U.S. cooperation.44 German agents were spreading rumors that the United 
States, after being granted access to port facilities and airbases within Mexico, would turn 
its sights on Mexico City and occupy the capital, too.45 This likely affected some 
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Mexican people who were alive when the United States continuously entered their 
sovereign country in the late 1800s and early 1900s. 
Mexico catered to Japanese officials, too. Japan needed oil and it requested the 
resource from Mexico. At the civilian level, U.S. officials made sure Mexico did not sell 
its oil stocks to Japan. However, shortly after the United States intervened in the Mexico 
oil export market, the Mexican Defense Secretary, General Agustin Castro, attempted to 
procure almost three million gallons of aviation fuel for his Air Forces. The U.S. Naval 
Attaché in Mexico reported, “the Mexican Air Force could not use more than 216,000 
gallons a year, therefore indicating that the greater part of the order was intended for re-
export to Japan.”46 Both of these incidents highlight the fact that Mexico simultaneously 
attempted to create a better situation for itself with Japan and Germany behind closed 
doors, and with the United States in public. Thankfully, these two incidents did not 
thwart cooperation in the Philippines between the United States and Mexico. Mexico 
found itself drawn into the war and in support of the United States when German U-boats 
successfully attacked Mexican civilian shipping lines of trade in the Atlantic Ocean.47 
In 1942, the United States created the Joint Mexican-United States Defense 
Commission through Executive Order (EO) 9080. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. argued that 
this commission “was integral in coordinating joint wartime defense activities, including 
Lend Lease and training, and constitutes one of the earliest joint cooperative forums with 
strong military content” between the United States and Mexico.48 Military interaction and 
coordination between the United States and Mexico occurred at all officer levels, and 
Mexican military officials emulated U.S. military training and tactics at their own 
bases.49 
Mexican military forces cooperated with U.S. forces in the Pacific Theater by 
sending its 201st Fighter Squadron from the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force to fight the 
                                                 
46 Paz, Strategy, Security, and Spies, 45. 
47 Turbiville, Jr., “U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico,” 6. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 7. 
 22
Japanese.50 These P-47 fighter pilots attended flight school in the United States and 
trained under U.S. Army Air Corps aviators. These newly minted fighter pilots flew 
alongside U.S. Air Corps forces in support of “offensive combat sorties in ground attack, 
fighter sweep, dive bombing, and other roles.”51 These events showed that Mexican 
military units could fight overseas and “contributed greatly to Mexican military 
modernization and training, improved mutual perceptions among military personnel of 
the two nations, and created precedent for future forms of military-to-military 
cooperation.”52 In the Western Hemisphere, Mexican gunboats and airplanes patrolled 
the western coast of Mexico “in collaboration with the United States Navy” to protect its 
shoreline from an internal axis threat that could move from the interior of Mexico and 
cause security concerns along the coast.53 
From World War II to the war on drugs, realism, again, explains why cooperation 
between the U.S. military and Mexican military began to form slowly. When the United 
States entered World War II, it triggered a manufacturing frenzy that transformed the 
United States into a strong world power. Mexico remained reserved, afraid the United 
States would trample over its sovereign rights. However, Mexico did understand that a 
common enemy in the world could bring the two countries to cooperate. The Axis powers 
provided that common enemy. Mexico also knew that its national security could be at 
risk. The United States was the hegemon in the region. Mexico likely felt cooperation 
would improve its national security interests and were content with the status quo. 
After the war on drugs declaration in 1972, the U.S. military found itself 
concentrating more on the threat of communism globally and less on Latin America 
despite the drug flow from drug trafficking within the Southern Hemisphere. A few 
important military relationships did develop from key military leaders, in the two 
countries, like U.S. General Gordon Sullivan and Mexican General Enrique Cervantes. 
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These relationships developed because the countries shared a common external security 
threat from drug traffickers moving through Mexico and into the United States. 
Individuals helped foster cooperation efforts between the two militaries, providing 
training and education in the United States. If the United States had attempted to provide 
this training in Mexico, cooperation would have been lower because of Mexico’s strict 
adherence to sovereignty. 
D. WAR ON DRUGS TO 9/11 
The U.S. military continued to engage the Cold War threat looming around the 
world.54 Latin America received little attention unless pressure from the Soviet Union 
affected the region with the spread of communism. U.S. military and Mexican military 
cooperation garnered little attention other than training curriculums in an educational 
environment, mostly with Mexican military personnel attending U.S. military-led 
training. Mexico had its fair share of domestic security issues and rarely, if ever, looked 
to the United States to provide international support against its enemies. Mexico was 
content with military cooperation in training to combat the rising drug trade problems in 
its country and to modernize its army and navy, as appropriate, whereas the United States 
wanted to focus the training on border and regional security in the hemisphere. Mexican 
presidents Carlos Salinas de Goratari De La Madrid, Jose Lopez Protillo, and Luis 
Echeverria brought a more conservative ideology to international relations, which were 
friendlier to the United States. 
In 1972, President Nixon declared a war on drugs because a dramatic importation 
of drugs from the southern border. Nixon’s declaration made it clear that the war on 
drugs would reach well in to Latin America and operations by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the U.S. military would become frequent in Latin America. To fill the 
need for cooperation in regions where the U.S. military could not go, Congress passed the 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976. This paid for, regulated, and allowed Mexican military 
officers to attend senior-level military schools and other military training institutions in 
                                                 
54 Turbiville, Jr., “U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico,” 11–12. 
 24
the United States. International Military Education and Training (IMET) was the official 
name of this program. Mexican military officers who attended this cooperative learning 
curriculum took their tactics and procedures back to Mexico and applied what they 
learned to the domestic security threat and drug trafficking from TOCs.55  
Mexican distaste for U.S. military intervention within its sovereign borders has 
always been a touchy subject. In 1980, Mexico created the National Museum of 
Interventions. This museum occupied the previous building used by Mexican military 
forces to fight back U.S. military troops moving into Mexico City in 1846. The museum 
highlights military engagements by the two countries during the Mexican-American War 
as well as the Texas Revolution and other cross-border skirmishes previously 
mentioned.56 
In 1986, the Mexican government rightly determined that drug cartels, human 
trafficking, and other guerrilla forces were causing security issues within its borders. 
Mexico reached out to the United States for assistance. The two countries agreed on “a 
military initiative that was to have future implications for Mexican force structure and 
U.S.-Mexican military interaction, together with it resulted in the 1986 creation of a 
Rapid Response Force, which by 1990 had become the first Airmobile Special Forces 
Group.”57 U.S. forces trained their Mexican military counterparts to work in small 
tactical groups to disrupt criminal organizations. 
In 1989, the United States created a U.S. Army drug task force along the 
Mexico/U.S. border to stop drug flows over the porous border. The location of this new 
task force was in El Paso, Texas. Mexico alerted the U.S. government to this mobilization 
and expressed “what it sees as growing militarization of the border.”58 This buildup of 
military units likely caused Mexico to remember the pains of its historical past of the 
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U.S. military invasion of Mexico.59 However, U.S. military officials pointed out that “our 
charter is restricted to anti-narcotics, and we are precluded from any law enforcement 
action, such as search, seizure, and arrest. We can provide the eyes and ears, but we can’t 
do anything as regards interdiction.”60  
The United States has a Defense Attaché in Mexico City. In 1992, Army General 
Joseph Stringham was the last U.S. Defense Attaché Flag Officer posted there and his 
personality as well as the willingness of the two countries defense agencies, strengthened 
close ties between the two.61 Since then, Field Grade Officers have assumed the Defense 
Attaché position. However, Turbiville argues that from 1992 to 1995, U.S. Army Chief of 
Staff General Gordon Sullivan should be credited with creating the strongest ties of 
military cooperation between the two countries, and rightly so, because Mexican military 
leadership held him in high regard.62 General Sullivan would meet with Mexican 
Secretary of National Defense, General Antonio Riviello, to discuss various ways the two 
military units could strengthen their relationship.63 Cooperation between the two armies 
included “initiatives constituting liaison visit and staff talks, airborne training, and 
additional security assistance along with continued IMET and in-country training.”64 
Meetings between the two generals and their lower level staffs concentrated on concerted 
efforts in cooperation to tackle counter drug operations.65 General Sullivan likely viewed 
military cooperation with Mexico as a vital security relationship. General Sullivan 
proposed guidance to help the two countries “share U.S. experiences regarding how 
media can best be informed of military activities that benefit society, develop a better 
understanding of Mexican military history,” and translate the Army Field Manual from 
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English to Spanish.66 General Sullivan continued his guidance by enabling military 
leaders to reach out to their cross-border counterparts, to develop meaningful 
relationships, and to create “Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and Personnel Exchange 
Programs (PEP)” to enhance cooperation efforts.”67 
In 1994, the Mexican Secretary of Defense, General Enrique Cervantes, visited 
the Pentagon. William J. Perry led the Department of Defense. In 1995, Secretary Perry 
visited Mexico, a first for any U.S. Defense Secretary. General Cervantes played host to 
Secretary Perry. Secretary Perry met with other Mexican military leaders like Mexican 
Navy Secretary Admiral Lorenzo Franco. This meeting in Mexico led to a U.S.-Mexico 
Bilateral Working Group. Cooperation within subgroups emphasized “counter narcotics, 
disaster relief, education, sovereignty of the seas, and military training.”68 Secretary 
Perry continued the cooperative work of General Sullivan and supported “ongoing 
military education and training efforts, and pointed to U.S.-sponsored military 
modernization plans that would help Mexico protect its air and sea sovereignty.”69 
Secretary Perry also announced in 1995 that the Mexican Navy and Army would be 
participating in an international exercise with the United States. Mexican officials quickly 
denounced those intentions and “made it clear that U.S.-Mexican military cooperation 
was confined to the modernization of equipment, training courses, and the academic 
exchange of officers as well as the cooperation on the fight against drug trafficking and 
assistance in facing natural disasters.”70 Clearly, Mexican civilian government leaders 
wanted to keep their forces engaged in domestic issues with the support and training from 
the United States instead of focusing on international or regional issues outside of 
Mexico. However, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo directed the Mexican Air Force, 
with the possible backing of the United States, to assist with the war on drugs and 
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intercept drug planes flying through the Gulf of Mexico bound for the United States and 
other gulf states.71 
In 1996, General Cervantes visited the United States again to further cooperation 
efforts in several prepared initiatives between the two defense departments. U.S. military 
officials were proposing to give the Mexican Air Force 73 UH-1H helicopters to upgrade 
their Air Force and provide more capabilities to Special Operations.72 Mexican military 
officials assumed these Vietnam-era helicopters were comparable to the cooperative aid 
U.S. military personnel gave to them from late 1980 to the early 1990s when Mexico 
received “10 times more U.S. arms than it accumulated between 1950–1983.”73 Aid in 
the form of U.S. F-5 planes, Bell helicopters, and communications equipment made its 
way to Mexico along with about $750 million in other U.S. military-affiliated 
equipment.74 In 1997, Secretary Perry left office and the military relationship between 
the two countries began to taper off.75 In 1999, Mexican military officials returned the 
UH-1H military helicopters to the United States because they were outdated and 
inadequate to the mission sets the Mexican military pursued, leaving Mexican 
government officials frustrated. 
In 2000, the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Working Group held its last meeting between 
the two countries’ defense departments.  The two countries would receive a wakeup call 
in the months ahead as September 11, 2001, tested U.S. national security policies. The 
years following ushered in new cooperation efforts to respond to international threats in 
the region. 
From the war on drugs to 9/11, we witness a shift in cooperation from realism to a 
more liberal approach. Mexico and the United States realized the drug trade from South 
and Central America was affecting their domestic security. Throughout this period, 
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Mexican military and U.S. military forces put formal institutions in place to combat drug 
traffickers. However, corruption within senior Mexican military ranks is a huge problem. 
In 1997, it was reported that senior military officials arrested a key drug dealer and later 
released him on the condition that he “clean up his business—halting the sale of drugs in 
Mexico, eschewing violence, helping the economy—if he was allowed to keep half his 
fortune and continue operating in peace.”76 This corruption diminishes formal institutions 
in place and restricts cooperation. Mexico cannot move past its historical realist ideology 
toward the United States and continues to view the United States with hesitation. 
However, established informal institutions, communicated in relationships, between 
individuals in the defense departments, further pushing a cooperative agenda to fight drug 
trafficking and other internal domestic security issues.  
After 9/11, NORTHCOM formed to provide national security oversight of 
Mexico, Canada, and the United States. This creation would upset the Mexican 
government because the United States failed to include Mexico in the security initiatives 
of the Western Hemisphere defined by NORTHCOM. President Bush signed the Mérida 
Initiative in 2007, providing initial funding to Mexico of $48 million and annual funding 
through FY2016, totaling $2.6 billion.  Finally, military cooperation efforts between the 
two countries continued to prosper with international naval exercises and coordinated 
efforts to combat drug trafficking. This period would provide further evidence that 
Mexican military and U.S. military cooperation occurred because of liberalism. The two 
countries established formal institutions to secure security and economic goals. While 
policies like the creation of NORTHCOM without Mexican input and Mexico’s reaction 
to this event leans toward realist perspectives, it pales in comparison to the Mérida 
Initiative and its overarching construct to bond the two countries together. 
E. 9/11 TO THE PRESENT 
The events of September 11, 2001 provided the U.S. government with a new 
focus on national security. The United States needed to respond to a threat that attacked 
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New York and the Pentagon. Military cooperation efforts soon focused on allies and 
coalition partners in the Middle East, namely Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Pakistan, among 
others. The United States has given little attention to Latin America, especially Mexico. 
However, border issues and drug trafficking continued to increase and sporadically, the 
two militaries found ways to cooperate to combat the growing threats of TOC. 
In 2001, the School of the Americas (SOA) was renamed the Western 
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSC). This school, located since 
1984 in Fort Benning, Georgia, historically trained military officers and non-
commissioned officers from Mexico on a frequent basis. WHINSC was previously 
located in Panama, but moved to the United States after the signing of the Panama Canal 
Treaty. From 1946 to 1995, “the school trained the relatively modest number of 766 
Mexican military personnel in topics that included courses for combat, combat support, 
and combat service support officers and noncommissioned officers as well as leadership, 
intelligence, counterinsurgency, and specialized or technical skills.”77 From 1996 to 
1997, almost 500 Mexican military students participated in courses offered at the school. 
U.S. military instructors led courses in Demolition, Special Operations, Civilian-Military 
Operations, Psychological Warfare Operations, and Staff Operations.78 Training at other 
U.S. military bases occurred, too, most notably at Lackland Air Force Base for Mexican 
aviators and aviation mechanics. 
In 2002, in response to the attacks on 9/11, the United States established 
NORTHCOM to promote national defense of the homeland and theater security defense 
within the region. NORTHCOM’s “AOR includes air, land, and sea approaches and 
encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, and Mexico and the 
surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles.”79 Canada and Mexico 
previously had no U.S. military oversight for national security.80 Prior to 9/11, 
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SOUTHCOM provided the funding to Mexican military and U.S. military representatives 
to carry out security cooperation training. Mexico did not like the United States 
unilaterally assigning Canada and Mexico to NORTHCOM without input from those 
countries.81 Mexico felt that military cooperation in security of the hemisphere would 
work best if all three countries worked together to formulate a posture.  Mexican Defense 
Secretary General Clemente Vega Garcia told his government that Mexico would not 
align with NORTHCOM demands.82 
In 2004, Mexican military officials attended Unified Defense, an exercise in 
Texas sponsored by NORTHCOM. In September 2005, the Mexican Secretary of the 
Navy invited the NORTHCOM Commander to visit Mexico and witness a Mexican 
Independence celebration.83  
In 2006, Mexico elected Felipe Calderon President. President Calderon was a 
huge supporter of the Mexican Navy cooperating with foreign navies in global exercises. 
Mexico participated in UNITAS, Latin for “unity,” which is a naval exercise that began 
in 1960 combining navies from countries in North, Central, and South America. Mexico 
has participated in this exercise, since 2002, and cooperated with the United States on 
various training evolutions like maritime security, drug interdiction, and surface warfare 
operations. In 2006, Mexican President Calderon decided to use Mexican military forces 
together with local law enforcement to combat TOC networks. President Calderon felt 
corruption in law enforcement was at an unprecedented level and rightly assumed that the 
Mexican military could step in with the help of their United States counterparts to train 
them for this new mission because Mexico and the United States wanted to reduce narco-
traffickers.84 Mexican military forces were ill prepared to combat these drug cartels in 
urban centers, which forced them to cooperate and learn from U.S. military trainers 
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across the border.85 Richard Downie argues, “President Calderon’s tasking of his military 
to confront the Transnational Organized Criminal’s in coordination with the United 
States placed the Mexican and U.S. militaries in a position to focus on a common threat 
on both sides of the border-for the first time in many years.”86 This is yet another 
example of one important individual having an impact on military cooperation efforts 
between the two countries. 
In 2007, President George W. Bush signed the Mérida Initiative. The Mérida 
Initiative highlighted the importance of U.S./Mexican efforts to thwart drug violence in 
the border region. Downie argues that actions by President Bush prompted Secretary of 
Defense, Robert Gates, to visit his Mexican counterparts and propose defense initiatives 
guided under the Mérida Initiative.87 Secretary Gates, “emphasized that the U.S. 
Department of Defense would help train and develop educational and informational 
exchanges for Mexican forces in a manner deferential to Mexican sovereignty.”88 In 
short, Secretary Gates wanted to be clear that the U.S. military would respect Mexican 
sovereignty, understanding the historical relationship between the two countries. Mexican 
military officials warmly accepted U.S. assistance and, according to Downie, eagerly 
received “equipment, training, information, and intelligence exchanges, as well as a 
variety of programs regarding strategic and operational leadership and campaign 
planning.”89 Because of the Mérida Initiative, Mexican military units received advanced 
military equipment like “aircraft and helicopters, night vision goggles, rigid hull 
inflatable boats, and protective ensembles, as well as tactical communications equipment 
intended to improve the Mexican military’s ability to deploy rapid reaction forces in 
support of police operations against drug cartels and to help conduct maritime 
surveillance.”90 This equipment, as well as the training Mexican military personnel 
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received, directly affected the ability of Mexican forces to take down criminal gangs.91 
That same year, the Mexican Navy Secretariat (SEMAR) placed an official at 
NORTHCOM to create a communications channel between NORTHCOM officials and 
SEMAR officials in Mexico. This further prompted NORTHCOM, in 2008, to host 
multiple Mexican military officials in Texas for a Border Commanders Conference 
(BBC) to discuss “border security issues, shared information, and addressed lessons 
learned.”92 The Mérida Initiative also provided approximately $420 million to the 
Mexican military and fell under the auspice of the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
program.93 
In 2009, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, met 
with the Mexican Secretary of the Navy and other high-ranking military officials in 
Mexico. They focused their meetings on drug enforcement, cartels, and corruption.94 This 
meeting also influenced the Mexican Senate to authorize “the participation of substantial 
Mexican Navy components in the exercise series UNITAS 50–90 from 19 April to May 
2009.”95 This substantial participation included multiple Mexican frigates, helicopters, 
multiple Mexican Marine platoons, and other support units. The Mexican Secretariat of 
National Defense (SEDENA) placed its own representative at NORTHCOM to ensure 
official communication channels were open between the two military agencies. 
In 2010, Admiral James Winnefeld assumed command of NORTHCOM. Admiral 
Winnefeld quickly understood the importance of a relationship between the U.S. and 
Mexican militaries.96 Admiral Winnefeld “placed a high priority on engagement with 
Mexico and conducted several personal visits with his Mexican counterparts. He also 
ensured that key members of his staff traveled frequently to Mexico to work closely with 
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the Mexican military on a wide range of information-sharing, intelligence, and campaign-
planning-related programs.”97 In 2011, news outlets reported that unarmed U.S. military 
drones flew intelligence collection missions into Mexican airspace to help assist Mexican 
military and local law enforcement officers.98 This information collaboration highlights 
cooperation efforts between the two countries to combat common drug trafficking 
practices. 
In 2012, President Barack Obama’s foreign policy objective was to pivot the 
United States from the Central Command (CENTCOM) Middle East AOR and 
concentrate more on the Pacific Command (PACOM) region, specifically Asia, once 
again putting Latin America on the backburner and out of sight. Military officials at 
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM continue to focus on the Western Hemisphere with 
regard to military cooperation, especially with Mexico. In 2013, Army Major General 
Francis G. Mahon, NORTHCOM’s Director for Strategy Plans and Policy, outlined 
security cooperation efforts the United States and Mexico are taking to combat the 
common threat of TOCs in the Western Hemisphere. General Mahon points out that the 
Mexican Army and Navy are moving beyond traditional internal security objectives, and 
with the cooperation of the United States, focusing more on “humanitarian assistance and 
disaster response throughout the region.”99 U.S. military officials at NORTHCOM are 
currently assisting Mexico with purchasing military grade C-130J Hercules Aircraft as 
well as RC-26 planes and UH-60 Blackhawks.100 In 2013, NORTHCOM ushered 
Mexican military doctors to Afghanistan to experience how American military doctors 
practice medicine on the battlefield. Finally, in October 2013, Mexican military officials 
participated in an international joint military exercise, a first for Mexico in air defense. 
The scenario called for “a rogue aircraft that flies from the United States into Mexico. 
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U.S. interceptor aircraft scrambled by North American Aerospace Defense Command 
will shadow the aircraft until it enters Mexican airspace, and then will transfer the 
mission to the Mexican air force.”101 These changes within the Mexican military to focus 
more on international and regional objectives instead of internal missions will likely lead 
to more cooperation with U.S. military personnel because U.S. military forces are also 
focused on international mission sets. 
Also in 2013, Mexican military and U.S. military officials butted heads with 
regard to rooting out corruption among Mexican security officials.102 The United States 
officials conducted polygraph tests on their Mexican counterparts to see if anyone within 
the joint drug trafficking task force was providing secrets to drug cartels.103 Mexican 
officials felt little trust of their U.S. counterparts, who were not required to take the 
polygraph test.104 This small event may pale compared to others, but it highlights the 
continued skepticism of the Mexican military toward the United States. 
In analyzing cooperation from 9/11 to present day, the U.S. and Mexican 
militaries continue to move in a liberal direction, establishing formal institutions to foster 
cooperation efforts against drug trafficking, and providing common defense of the 
Western Hemisphere. Proponents of realism would argue that treaties and other 
documents signed by the two countries would break apart if one country felt another 
country violated its sovereignty or a power struggle ensued; I would argue that scenario 
would not occur. The United States recognizes the historical differences between the two 
countries and therefore respects Mexican sovereignty and understands that cooperation 
needs to form slowly with trust and transparency. Mexico, always on guard, respects the 
formal institutions put in place to enhance cooperation, and knows that cooperation with 
the United States brings in money and valuable training to help in combating drug 
trafficking and domestic issues, things Mexico desperately needs. 
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Analyzing each international relations theory occurred based on the independent 
variables of external security and internal instability. As indicated in Table 1, realism best 
explains international relations from the 1800s to present day between the United States 
and Mexico.  Table 2 is a consideration of whether cooperation occurred, and the reasons 
why or why not cooperation occurred. Realism appears to be the driving force in 
cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican militaries, and the reason why cooperation 
failed many years ago. Over the last couple of decades, a shift in economic cooperation 
aligned with security interests, changed the realist mindset of the two countries. This 
gave way to more liberal thought on cooperation. 
Table 1.   Analyzing how each Hypothesis Applies to Relations between the 
United States and Mexico105 
 Realism Liberalism Constructivism 
Prior to WWII Yes No No 
WWII to War on Drugs Yes No No 
War on Drugs to 9/11 Yes Yes Yes 
9/11 to Present Yes Yes No 
Total: 4 2 1 
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Table 2.   Reasons for U.S. Military and Mexican Military Cooperation106 




No cooperation existed. The two countries were 





Limited cooperation existed. The two countries 
cooperated internationally against a common enemy, 
the Axis powers, but sovereignty issues along the 





Cooperation existed because the two countries saw a 
need to combat drug trafficking. Establishing formal 
institutions to facilitate cooperation efforts, and 
civilian leadership in Mexico, became more 




Cooperation exists today to combat drug trafficking, 
internal instability within Mexico, and regional 
security in the Western Hemisphere. Developing 
formal institutions, like the Mérida Initiative, 
continue to facilitate cooperation. 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
Given the rollercoaster history of military cooperation from the middle 1800s to 
the present day, obstacles engrained in the two countries prevent complete cooperation. 
In today’s dynamic security environment affected by climate change, terrorism, 
transnational organized crime, drug enforcement, human smuggling, and border security, 
it is paramount that the military service branches from the two countries come together 
and cooperate to combat these events. Mexico will likely need to make political changes 
within its own government to make any noticeable changes in military cooperation. 
Likewise, the United States will need to be sensitive to Mexican military history and the 
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challenges Mexico faced when the United States expanded into Mexican territory in the 
latter half of the 1800s.  
Overall, the two countries need to understand they have different security 
ambitions for their respective militaries. The Mexican military focuses more on the 
internal threat from drug cartels, TOCs, and human trafficking.107 The Mexican 
government has tasked its military to assist law enforcement branches in enforcing the 
law, whereas the U.S. military follows laws that forbid it from enforcing laws on citizens 
within its borders. The United States uses its military for different purposes, mainly 
fighting external threats and taking the fight to the enemy overseas. Mexican military 
officials may see this as United States’ encroachment on its sovereignty, even if it is just 
a training evolution in country or an assist visit for a mission. The U.S. military would 
view it as normal business. For the two militaries to cooperate at a high level, a thorough 
understanding of each other’s mission at all military ranks, and an equal understanding of 
common security goals, is essential. Today, that communication is developing, 
highlighted by a recent phone conversation between Defense Secretary James Mattis, 
Mexico’s Secretary of National Defense General Salvador Zepeda, and Secretary of the 
Navy Admiral Vidal Sanz, during which the three discussed “their commitment to the 
North American Defense Ministerial process, and working with Canada to address 
mutual defense challenges to North America.”108 
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III. EVALUATING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND COLOMBIAN MILITARIES  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. military and Colombian military have never engaged one another in all-
out combat operations as the U.S. and Mexican militaries had in the late 1800s. 
Cooperation between the U.S. and Colombian militaries from the 1800s to just before 
World War II did not happen because the United States supported Panama breaking off 
from Colombia, forcing the two militaries to assume defensive. During World War II, 
however, the two countries found common ground in defending the Panama Canal from 
Axis powers. This common ground led to many military cooperation events and would 
serve as a catalyst for future military cooperation. 
From World War II through the United States’ 1972 war on drugs declaration, the 
Colombian military and the U.S. military cooperated together in foreign engagements, 
like the Korean War, where Colombian military units supported U.S. military units on the 
Korean Peninsula. The Colombian and U.S. militaries cooperated to combat the war on 
drugs in Colombia by taking down major drug kingpins and combating the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and against TOCs moving drugs from Colombia to 
the United States. After 9/11, Colombian military and U.S. military officials further 
enhanced cooperation by signing multiple agreements allowing U.S. military service 
members to permanently serve within Colombian borders to advise, train, and assist 
Colombian military units in combatting the drug problem, as well as providing up to $10 
billion in aid. 
Within the last five years, Colombian military and U.S. military personnel have 
continued to train in Colombia, in the United States, and in other Latin American 
countries. The two countries continue to lead in exercises like UNITAS, and Colombia is 
starting to take what it has learned from the U.S. military to train other countries like 
Mexico. Renewed partnership agreements continue and funds to combat drug trafficking 
remain.  
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Focused efforts by individuals either helped foster cooperative efforts between the 
defense services or damaged the situation through fighting or political posturing. While 
bilateral military cooperation started out with the common defense of the Panama Canal 
during World War II, today the two countries need to continue to build partnerships to 
enhance security efforts in the Caribbean and Central America at the military level in 
order to reduce drug flows into the United States. 
This chapter analyzes major events that took place from the early 1900s to the 
present day between the Colombian and U.S. militaries. It further answers the question: 
what explains the variation in timing and substance in cooperation between the U.S. and 
Colombia? I argue, in tune with realist perspectives, that cooperation between the U.S. 
and Colombian militaries occurs when the two countries benefit from cooperating against 
external security threats, and when the two countries share economic interests in the 
region. International relations theory can help explain reasons why two or more states 
cooperate with each other. The realist argument is the strongest explanation for when and 
why Colombia and the United States cooperate militarily. Formal institutions established 
between the two governments solidify their commitment to each other to achieve 
common goals, but these institutions formed because the two countries shared in 
defending a common economic interest like the Panama Canal. These individual 
relationships continue today with officer exchange programs for training purposes and 
combined military units working hand-in-hand in Colombia to combat the drug problem. 
Informal relationships between individuals eventually grow into formal institutions like 
treaties and cooperation agreements. Constructionism could explain some of the social 
relationship efforts moving toward cooperation. However, if corruption exists in the 
Colombian Army, police, and court system, it will likely prevent reliable social 
relationships from forming. Cooperation between the two countries occurs because of 
common threats to national security in the region, historically good formal and informal 
institutions, mutually beneficial economic ties, and their preferences toward each other 
within their institutions. This became apparent during World War II and blossomed even 
more with Colombia’s internal domestic drug issues with organizations like the FARC. 
Continued military cooperation will occur as long as the two countries favor a common 
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external security goal to fight drug trafficking, establish informal relationships with key 
personnel, and create written partnership agreements that provide fair prosperity. 
B. PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II 
The Colombian civil war, referred to as the Thousand Days’ War, lasted from 
1899 until late 1902. Leaders from the two parties signed a peace agreement aboard the 
U.S. Navy battleship, USS Wisconsin (BB-64). The signing on a U.S. Navy ship is 
significant because it showed the Colombians trusted U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt 
and the U.S. military.109 President Roosevelt wanted regional stability in the area because 
of proposals for a canal connecting the Atlantic Ocean and Pacific Ocean. United States 
and Colombian representatives agreed on the Panama Canal prior to 1903, but the plan 
failed to pass the Colombian Senate, discouraging a frustrated President Roosevelt.110 In 
1903, Panama seceded from Colombia and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began 
building the Panama Canal. This United States course of action prompted the Colombian 
government to send Colombian military units to the area.111 The U.S. Navy prevented the 
Colombian Navy from entering the Isthmus of Panama and U.S. Marines stationed ashore 
protected American citizens from Colombian troops moving north. Bradley Coleman, an 
historian expert in Colombia-U.S. relations and the current command historian at 
SOUTHCOM, argues, “Colombia and the United States needed the next thirty years to 
undo the damage inflicted in 1903.”112 However, like war between Mexico and the 
United States, military armed action between Colombia and the United States did not 
happen. 
In 1933, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave a passionate speech in his 
inaugural address to the people of the United States. In his “Good Neighbor Policy” 
speech, President Roosevelt wanted to shape the U.S. relationship with Latin America by 
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stressing cooperation and economic commerce instead of using the U.S. military to 
stabilize the Western Hemisphere. This foreign policy change was a good sign to 
countries in Latin America who were used to U.S. military interventions in the early 
1900s. 
In 1938, three U.S. Army “Flying Fortress” airplanes landed in Bogota, 
Colombia. President Roosevelt sent these U.S. Army planes as a sign of peace and unity 
between Colombia and the United States “during the inauguration of Colombian 
President Eduardo Santos Montejo.”113 The U.S. Army pilots mingled with Colombian 
military leaders and officials over the course of a few days, leading Colombian President 
Montejo to express his appreciation for and enthusiasm about the pilots, and ultimately 
asking U.S. civilian representatives to send U.S. military personnel to assist his own 
military.114 Coleman argues that President Montejo felt U.S. military training would 
enhance his own military capabilities and “promote bilateral cooperation during a time of 
international security.”115 A strong relationship that started on the civilian side between 
the two Presidents eventually moved to military officers from the two countries. That 
same year, “the United States government announced … that naval and military air 
missions [would] go to the Republic of Colombia soon to cooperate with that country in 
improving its defensive forces.”116 This was in response to the Colombians asking for 
U.S. military assistance and the United States agreeing, in writing, to provide military 
advisory support to the Colombians.117 
In 1939, right after the Lima Conference, U.S. military advisors entered 
Colombia, began training Colombian military counterparts, and established relationships 
that would lead to military cooperation during World War II.118 The two countries 
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realized they needed military cooperation to protect and defend the Panama Canal 
because it was a strategic choke point employed by the U.S. Navy to move warships 
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Colombian Navy also used the canal to 
move its warships and commercial vessels. President Montejo continuously reaffirmed 
his commitment to President Roosevelt, viewing the Panama Canal “as vital to the life of 
American and vital to the defense of the United States.”119 Much like treaties that bind 
two or more countries today, this bilateral security cooperation effort between Colombia 
and the United States likely hinged on a verbal commitment within a strong relationship 
between the two Presidents and the defense department leaders.  
Coleman argues, “in 1939, two important staff tours promoted bilateral 
understanding, critical to accomplishing the Colombia-American military agenda in the 
years ahead.”120 The two meetings that occurred in 1939 would lead to further 
cooperation in the future. Colombian Army General Luis Acevedo and his staff of senior 
officers met with U.S. Army Major General David Stone and his staff at the Panama 
Canal to discuss Panama Canal defenses, observe U.S. Army exercises, and regional 
security involvement.121 In that same year, General Stone and his staff flew to Bogota, 
Colombia to witness Colombian military forces practicing “infantry artillery, cavalry 
school maneuvers, and inspected medical corps facilities and the institute of military 
geography.”122 This visit highlighted the “shared responsibility” between the two 
countries to defend strategic points in the Western Hemisphere together and identify 
possible miscues or perceptions of each other in achieving defense goals.123 
A realist argument best explains when and why Colombia and the United States 
cooperated during this period: the two countries shared a common external security threat 
to economic stability. Individuals in the U.S. and Colombian militaries, who had 
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foresight to see a lack of government engagement in the region, likely, used backchannels 
to open dialogue and cooperation efforts to combat an imminent attack from the Axis 
countries against the Panama Canal.  
World War II would provide the two countries with more opportunities to 
cooperate. The two shared the common defense of the Panama Canal and would work 
together to establish a Defense Command to accomplish that goal. The Panama Canal is a 
strategic economic chokepoint that required protection from a host of countries that had 
the means to do so. Colombia and the United States were the two major players because 
Colombian territory was near the entrance and exit points and the United States built the 
canal. Colombian military and U.S. military cooperation would also extend past the 
Western Hemisphere in foreign conflicts like the Korean War. Colombia, a regional 
power and a country that likely wanted recognition on the international stage, contributed 
its military cooperation efforts to the United Nations, other allies, and the United States, 
against threats from other countries around the globe. 
C. WORLD WAR II TO THE WAR ON DRUGS 
In 1941, the United States established the U.S. Caribbean Defense Command in 
Panama. This command would defend the Panama Canal and provide forces to defend 
Colombia from German attacks from the east and western attacks from Japan.124 Plans 
within the command called for U.S. forces to occupy major ports and cities in Colombia. 
Colombian President Santos argued to his own people that it was necessary for Colombia 
to guard such a strategic point, stating, “Inter-American economic cooperation should be 
converted into deeds with the stronger assisting the weaker nations,” because he knew he 
would need the United States’ support to make such a commitment.125 Colombian 
military officials and the president himself did not object to such a plan should the need 
arise, and opened Colombian airports to the command throughout the duration of the 
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war.126 Colombia assigned Colombian Army General Pablo Lopez to be the liaison 
between Colombia and the U.S. Caribbean Defense Command. 
In 1942, U.S. and Colombian government officials signed a security partnership 
focusing on military bilateral cooperation in domestic security and counterespionage 
against the Axis powers in the Western Hemisphere.127 Bradley Coleman argues, “the 
country’s wartime contribution, combined with the efforts of the other Latin American 
republics, allowed the United States to focus on overseas operation.”128 Later that year, a 
German submarine attacked and sank the Colombian Navy ship ARC Resolute north of 
Colombia. German submariners then targeted the abandoning crew, killing many.129 This 
triggered an even greater resolve for Colombia to cooperate with the United States 
against the Axis powers. 
World War II may have been a wakeup call for the Colombian government to 
reach out to the United States to help strengthen its own military apparatus. U.S. 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the Ambassador to Colombia signed a written 
agreement to train the Colombian military.130 Colombian officials placed U.S. military 
advisors in Colombian military schools to train forces in ground movement tactics, 
effective leadership skills, and communications.131 U.S. military advisors taught courses 
in advanced weapons handling, communications, and land navigation. However, a series 
of events, highlighted by Coleman, would likely be the key to cooperation efforts for 
years to come. U.S. military and Colombian military construction and engineering 
officers worked together to build projects around the country. Coleman points out, 
“During that work, U.S. military personnel had their first contact with Lieutenant Colonel 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the chief of the Colombian Army engineering section and future 
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president of Colombia.”132 Leaving a solid foundation of good cooperation in Colonel 
Pinilla’s mind would likely have resulted in greater cooperation later.  
The U.S. military and Colombian military cooperated during the Korean War 
because the Colombian government wanted to support the United States, and United 
Nations, in stopping communism. Colombia provided an infantry battalion and a naval 
vessel to fight in Korea alongside U.S. military counterparts in 1951. The naval vessel, 
offered by Colombia to patrol the Korean waters, was the Almirante Padilla, a frigate-
class ship outfitted for combat by U.S. Sailors and civilians during a port-of-call at Naval 
Base San Diego, California, before steaming to Korea.133 Colombian soldiers arrived in 
Korea by way of a U.S. transportation vessel Aiken Victory because the Colombians had 
no large navy ships to transport their military units across the Pacific Ocean.134 Russell 
Ramsey investigated the purpose of this Colombian unit and concluded, “the Colombian 
Battalion fought as part of a U.S. division throughout the entire conflict. On December 9, 
the battalion was presented the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation by General James Van 
Fleet, and on January 4, 1953, it received the U.N. service medal.”135 While fighting 
alongside their U.S. military counterparts, the Colombians lost 131 men and 448 others 
sustained combat wounds.136 Bradley Coleman argues, “Colombia demonstrated to the 
United States its reliability in the campaign against international communism, setting the 
scene for greater postwar bilateral cooperation.”137 Colombia really had no economic ties 
to the Korea Peninsula, but likely felt that a commitment to support the United States’ 
democratic values around the world could potentially open new partnerships and 
cooperation efforts domestically. 
In 1955, the U.S. Army decided to create a course in Colombia similar to its U.S. 
Army Ranger school. Colombians call this course the “Lancero” course; it still trains 
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Colombian military and U.S. military soldiers today.138 U.S. Army personnel continue to 
go through this course and integrate into the staff to teach future trainees. Colombian 
soldiers learn combat skills in various environments like the jungle and mountains at 
advanced courses taught at the Lancero course. U.S. Army soldiers developed this course 
with their Colombian counterparts to ensure the “success of the U.S. security cooperation 
mission in Colombia because it helps build the capabilities of the Colombian Army” 
continues, and it creates “a stronger regional and global partner capable of assisting the 
United States and other countries in military training and operations.”139 
From 1954 to 1964 in Colombia, Georgia, and Texas, U.S. military advisors 
trained roughly 250 Colombian army soldiers to combat domestic insurgencies, and 
increased that number by 50 more Colombian army soldiers in 1964 because the 
Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) posed a direct threat to domestic stability in 
Colombia.140 Colombian military units tried to disrupt PCC activities in the rural areas, 
but the disruption eventually gave birth to the FARC organization.141 U.S. military and 
Colombian military units would find themselves cooperating extensively for decades to 
combat this organization. 
Agreements signed between Colombia, the United States, and the United Nations 
define the military cooperation that occurred during this period. Proponents of liberalism 
could explain why the two countries entered into formal agreements and pushed their 
military units to cooperate with each other. However, proponents of realism can best 
explain why the two governments cooperated to defend the Panama Canal. A formal 
agreement to establish a defense command solidified that common economic goal. 
Proponents of realism could also explain why Colombia jumped at UN offers to support 
the Korean conflict because Colombia wanted to ally with the big states selling their anti-
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communist rhetoric. Finally, the United States and Colombia likely established contracts 
to make the Colombians ready to fight at sea and on land. 
The 1990s would see Colombian military and U.S. military units retreat from 
cooperation efforts mainly due to corruption within Colombian ranks spurred by 
powerful drug leaders. Colombian government officials and law enforcement personnel 
would likely warn drug traffickers of upcoming counter-drug missions, effectively saving 
them from interdictions and raids. It would take key U.S. military officials to recognize 
the internal political instability in Colombia, get the U.S. Congress on board to fund 
military cooperation to stop the drug trafficking that was causing the instability, and 
target the terrorist groups in Colombia that were threatening future stabilization. This 
period saw the implementation of Plan Colombia, which would provide almost $8 billion 
through 2012 to reduce drug trafficking and combat organizations like the FARC. 
D. WAR ON DRUGS TO 9/11 
U.S. military and Colombian military cooperation and financial aid dropped off 
during the early 1990s because of human-rights abuses coming from the Colombian 
military.142 United States money still flowed in, but from other government agencies like 
the Department of State, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and CIA. This funding 
allowed their Colombian counterparts to continue to reduce drug trafficking with minimal 
military intervention. However, a few military cooperation efforts, like military combat 
training in Colombia and the United States with Special Operations Forces, still existed. 
In 1990, President George H.W. Bush was present at a summit on illicit drugs in 
Cartagena, Colombia. Security concerns for President Bush were high, and Colombian 
military and U.S. military officials agreed to provide naval vessels off the coast of 
Colombia for security support. Before, during, and briefly after the summit, a U.S. 
amphibious ship, a U.S. destroyer and a Colombian military vessel sailed together, likely 
conducting training evolutions as a Surface Action Group (SAG) while providing ready 
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security to units in Colombia.143 President Bush contemplated talking to Colombian 
officials about establishing a few U.S. Navy ships off the coast of Colombia to interdict 
drug shipments by air and sea.144 This action showed that the two countries could steam 
together, and likely strengthened his argument that coalition ships permanently stationed 
off the coast of Colombia could be successful. However, Colombian civilians hated the 
idea of permanent U.S. Navy ships off their coastline.145 
In 1991, U.S. Special Forces assisted Colombian military units with the take 
down and capture of Pablo Escobar, a notorious drug lord who led a drug trade 
organization responsible for almost 80% of all cocaine entering the United States.146 
However, shortly after his arrest, Escobar escaped from jail with the help of military 
officials and local police.147 In 1993, the U.S. Congress decided to fund the Colombian 
National Police (CNP) instead of the Colombian military because congressional leaders 
thought the CNP had less corruption.148 However, in 1994, U.S. congressional leaders 
amended their position and entrusted “the U.S. Secretary of State to certify that military 
assistance to Colombia will be used primarily for counter narcotics activities.”149 U.S. 
civilian leadership restricted military cooperation because the Colombian military had 
proved incapable of fending off corruption and unable to reduce human rights abuses. 
U.S. Army General Barry R. McCaffrey had to step in and ease the tensions between the 
two countries. It is possible that a relationship was established between General 
McCaffrey and Colombian General Manuel Jose Bonett during General McCaffrey’s visit 
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to Colombia, in 1997, because General Bonett claimed the meeting was a “turning point” 
with “a stronger desire to understand us now, to not consider us the bad guys” as it 
related to trusting the Colombian military.150 Also in 1994, U.S. military engineers 
cooperating with their Colombian counterparts to build schools and other structures in 
Colombia faced mounting criticism from civilian leaders in the Colombian congress.151 
Colombian President Cesar Gaviria came to the aid of this cooperation effort, calling the 
criticism political banter.152 Many Colombian citizens felt the U.S. military presence 
amounted to occupation of their country.153 However, likely based on strong 
relationships, the Colombian president and the military continued with their planned 
operations.  
In 1997, General Charles E. Wilhelm assumed command of USSOUTHCOM. 
Dean Cook argues that General Wilhelm “played a significant role in shaping United 
States policy toward Colombia” by shifting internal counterdrug joint operations from 
U.S./Colombian National Police to U.S. Military/Colombian Military cooperation.154 
During his three-year tour, General Wilhelm oversaw the implementation of “Plan 
Colombia,” a program approved in 2000 and designed to provide $1.3 billion to 
Colombia to fight drug trafficking in the region, and about 80% of all funds went to the 
Colombian military.155 Colombia and the United States realized the FARC posed a 
security concern within Colombia. Drugs were flowing in and out of Colombia, and 
violence in the countryside continued to rise.156 
Colombian military forces found themselves outgunned and outmanned by 
internal armed organizations, like the National Liberation Army (ELN) or FARC, when 
                                                 
150 Michael Evans, ed., War in Colombia: Guerrillas, 1. 




154 Cook, “U.S. Southern Command: General Charles E. Wilhelm,” 127. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid., 128. 
 51
the situation escalated.157 Cook argues that a defining moment occurred in March 1998 
within the Colombian military, exposing institutional inadequacies to deal with armed 
groups. Cook states, “while conducting search and destroy operations, two companies of 
the Colombian Army’s 52nd Counter-Guerilla Battalion began to pursue what they though 
was a small band of FARC soldiers. In fact, the companies fell into a carefully prepared 
ambush by a FARC force of at least 400 fighters. When the fighting ended, 62 soldiers 
were dead, 47 were wounded, and 43 had been captured by the FARC.”158 General 
Wilhelm rightly looked at this situation and knew the Colombians needed United States 
military security cooperation to assist his Colombian military counterparts. In December 
1998, U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and the newly elected President of 
Colombia, Andres Pastrana, “announced steps … to intensify military cooperation in the 
war on drug trafficking, including a pledge to increase Pentagon training of Colombia’s 
armed forces and to share more aerial and satellite intelligence data.”159 The relationship 
built between these two leaders likely started a military cooperation effort to fight drug 
trafficking against TOCs with Colombia receiving U.S. military training, and the U.S. 
benefiting from improved regional security and influence to stop drug flows into the 
United States.  The two leaders signed an agreement to solidify an arrangement that 
provided regular military-to-military open-door communication.160  
Through his position, General Wilhelm looked at the dire situation in Colombia 
and felt the United States played too small a role in combating the problems the 
Colombian military faced. Cook argues, “the Colombian military was the only public 
institution that warranted a large U.S. investment,” and that the U.S. military should 
engage with Colombian military anti-drug units to tackle the FARC and other TOC 
groups operating in the remote areas of Colombia.161 General Wilhelm met with 
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Colombian Army Commander General Mora in January of 1999 to discuss possible 
counterdrug assistance and cooperation opportunities.162 After that meeting, 
SOUTHCOM sent U.S. military planners to Colombia to assist Colombian forces with 
their counterdrug missions, along with $7 million to train and equip Colombian forces. 
This would be the beginning of a renewed relationship between the U.S. military and the 
Colombians. Eventually, General Wilhelm would fight for Plan Colombia, an aid 
package that would turn a dilapidated Colombian military into a fighting force, equipped 
and trained by the United States, ready to take on the FARC. When General Wilhelm 
retired in 2003, Colombian General Mora called Wilhelm, “Colombia’s favorite friend in 
the United States.”163 
Colombia and the United States realized they needed to work together to reduce 
drug violence and internal instability caused by the FARC. Realism best explains military 
cooperation during this time period because Colombia knew it needed the U.S. military to 
help in strengthening its military to reduce domestic issues causing internal instability, 
and the United States needed Colombia to assist with the drug trafficking moving drugs 
from South and Central America to the United States. Formal and informal institutions 
played a crucial role during this period, mainly coming from Plan Colombia, which gave 
Colombians the money and military support they needed to combat the drug trade and 
fight organizations like the FARC and ELN. 
The effects of 9/11 would usher in more security cooperation efforts in the 
Western Hemisphere. U.S. military service members found themselves growing in 
numbers, at Colombian military installations, training Colombian military officials. A 
push to label TOC organizations, like the FARC as terrorists, gained ground and renewed 
cooperation efforts between U.S. military and Colombian military units. The FARC 
caused internal instability within Colombia, and the Colombians likely knew they needed 
U.S. military assistance to combat this growing internal threat. A change in the law 
would allow the Colombians to use funds from Plan Colombia to fight the FARC. 
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E. 9/11 TO PRESENT 
September 11, 2001 brought a renewed commitment by the U.S. military to take 
the fight to terrorist organizations around the world. The FARC, labeled a terrorist 
organization in Colombia by the United States in October 1997, would soon see 
Colombian military and U.S. military forces cooperate to destroy their will to fight. In 
2002, “the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on President Bush 
to submit legislation to assist the Government of Colombia to protect its democracy from 
United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations.”164 This would allow Colombia 
to use U.S. aid, set aside for combating drugs in Plan Colombia, to fight organizations 
deemed as terrorists. In October 2002, U.S. military advisers provided military training to 
roughly 4,000 Colombian soldiers, along with weapons and equipment, to fight the 
FARC.165 Jim Rochlin argues that “between 1999 and 2004, some 32, 458 Colombians 
received U.S. military training, and by 2003 Colombia was the recipient of more U.S. 
training than any other country.”166 This training likely served two purposes: Colombian 
military units could now go on the offensive and take the fight to the FARC, and the 
United States, under the cover of labeling the FARC terrorists, could tackle the TOC drug 
trade flowing from Colombia into the United States. 
In 2004, the SOUTHCOM Senior Enlisted Leader (SEL), Army Command 
Sergeant Major Michael M. Balch, expanded a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) 
course for the Colombian Army, Airforce, and Navy in Miami, Florida.167 This 11-week 
course, offered twice a year, focuses on tactical and strategic leadership at the enlisted 
level instead of the standard weapons and field training Colombians typically receive 
from U.S. advisors. 
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In July 2008, Colombian military and U.S. military units worked together to 
rescue former “Colombian Senator Ingrid Betancourt and three U.S. military 
contractors,” who worked for SOUTHCOM on reconnaissance systems.168 The FARC 
kidnapped Betancourt in February 2002. Betancourt belonged to the Green party in 
Colombia and likely held different views that threatened the FARC politically. The 
Colombian military led the rescue effort, but Colombian military and U.S. military 
intelligence officials cooperated behind the scenes.169 U.S. military units also trained 
their Colombian counterparts in rescue techniques and other training directives.170 The 
operation itself was secret and U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield gave little details 
about the mission to press questions. Yet, this small event between the two militaries 
showed the strength in military cooperation between the United States and Colombia.  
In October 2009, Colombian and U.S. civilian officials signed a military 
cooperation agreement allowing U.S. military units access to seven Colombian military 
bases.171 The two parties signed this cooperation agreement “in an effort to boost anti-
drug and counter-insurgency operations.”172 U.S. Congressional leaders set a cap of 800 
U.S. military personnel in Colombia at a time prior to the agreement. From 2000 to 2009, 
Colombia received about $6 billion in military aid and will likely receive another $46 
million with this new agreement.173  
Since 2010, the U.S. Army stationed flight instructors in Melgar, Colombia, 
assigned to the Colombian Regional Helicopter Training Center. Since 2001, 
USSOUTHCOM provided U.S. Army advisors, in a temporary status, to train at this 
facility. U.S. government officials felt cooperation between Colombia and the United 
States were moving in the right direction and granted permanent training status in 
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2010.174 These U.S. Army instructors train 50 Colombian and 24 international military 
pilots annually in basic helicopter operations. The school operates 30 Bell OH-58 
helicopters used actively by the U.S. Army from 1969 to 2016.175 The U.S. government 
provides funding for the U.S. Army instructors, training helicopters, and associated parts 
and support for maintenance.176 
In 2013, SOUTHCOM Commander John Kelly and Colombian Minister Juan 
Carlos Pinzon started UNITAS 2013 in Cartagena, Colombia. The Colombians hosted 
UNITAS 2013, a naval exercise combining 15 countries, designed to strengthen 
cooperation at sea. Rear Admiral Sinclair Harris stated, “participants in UNITAS 2013 
[would] focus on coalition building, multilateral security cooperation, tactical 
interoperability and mutual understanding among the participants.”177 
On February 4, 2015, then U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, visited 
Colombia to meet with his counterparts in the Colombian Defense and Navy. Mabus 
highlighted the trip in his remarks about recent cooperation efforts between the 
Colombian Navy and U.S. Navy to include RIMPAC, Dawn Blitz, and UNITAS in 
2014.178 Secretary Mabus spoke to Colombian military and U.S. military personnel 
during his visit, and stated, “we value the robust and unique relationship we enjoy with 
Colombia. Strong military cooperation is a critical element of our dynamic partnership 
and we look forward to strengthening this relationship in the future.”179 Having senior 
U.S. and Colombian civilian officials discussing cooperation efforts between the 
militaries gives military leaders the support they need to continue cooperating and 
building relationships between each other.  
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Plan Colombia changed slightly after 9/11 to make sure the U.S. and Colombia 
took the fight to terrorists, too, and not just to drug lords and TOCs. More established 
formal and informal institutions appeared during this period to combat terrorism and 
support other regional issues. Liberalism best explains cooperation between the 
Colombian and U.S. militaries. U.S. military advisors still train their Colombian 
counterparts in all aspects of the military from leadership to weapons training. This 
training occurs in the United States and in Colombia with many U.S. military personnel 
stationed permanently in Colombia. The two countries realize they must work together to 
combat the drug trade, fight internal instability within Colombia caused by organizations 
like the FARC, and establish formal institutions to ensure one is not taken advantage of, 
like a restriction in the amount of U.S. military personnel in Colombia at any one time. 
Informal institutions are likely set up to deal with the corruption that still may be 
apparent within certain Colombian military units, but reporting on this is not widespread. 
F. ANALYSIS 
Analyzing each international relations theory occurred based on the independent 
variables of external security and internal instability. As indicated in Table 3, realism best 
explains international relations between the two countries from the 1900s to the present 
day. Table 4 will show whether cooperation occurred and the reasons why or what 
limited cooperation efforts, between the U.S. and Colombian militaries. While liberalism 
can explain recent cooperation efforts between the two countries, and constructivism 
could explain the start of cooperation, realism appears to be the driving force for military 
cooperation between the two countries. Earlier relationships between the United States 
and Colombia occurred because of a common external security threat and a common 
interest in economic prosperity in the region. Cooperation efforts continued over the past 
three decades because of the internal instability within Colombia posed by drug 
traffickers and other terrorist organizations. 
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Table 3.   Analyzing how each Hypothesis Applies to Relations between the 
United States and Colombia180 
 Realism Liberalism Constructivism 
Prior to WWII Yes No Yes 
WWII to War on Drugs Yes Yes No 
War on Drugs to 9/11 Yes Yes No 
9/11 to Present Yes Yes No 
Total: 4 3 1 
 
Table 4.   Reasons for U.S. Military and Colombian Military Cooperation181 
 Cooperation Reason 
Prior to 
WWII 
Med Cooperation did not exist when Panama broke from 
Colombia. U.S. supported Panamanian government. 
Cooperation took form when Colombians realized the 




High Cooperation occurred due to an external security threat from 
Axis powers during WWII. Further cooperation occurred on 
the international stage when Colombia signed an agreement 




Med Internal instability in Colombia from organizations like the 
FARC and ELN, and external security issues from TOCs 
fosters cooperation between the U.S. and Colombian 
militaries. Mil-to-Mil cooperation dropped off for a period 




High Internal instability in Colombia from the FARC and ELN, 
and external security issues from TOCs continue to foster 
military cooperation between the two countries. Established 
formal institutions, like Plan Colombia, solidified 
cooperation with training and equipment. 
 
                                                 
180 Table 3 is adapted from Dean A. Cook, “U.S. Southern Command: General Charles E. Wilhelm 
and the Shaping of U.S. Military Engagement in Colombia, 1997–2000,” in America’s Viceroys: The 
Military and U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Derek S. Reveron (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004); 
Bradley Coleman, Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939–1960 
(Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2008). 
181 Table 4 is adapted from Dean A. Cook, “U.S. Southern Command: General Charles E. Wilhelm 
and the Shaping of U.S. Military Engagement in Colombia, 1997–2000,” in America’s Viceroys: The 
Military and U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Derek S. Reveron (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004); 
Bradley Coleman, Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939–1960 
(Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2008). 
 58
G. CONCLUSION 
Cooperation between the U.S. military and Colombian military has grown at a 
steady pace since the two governments agreed to defend the Panama Canal during World 
War II. Few obstacles prevent cooperation, such as those obstacles visible during the 
1980s and early 1990s when corruption became apparent within Colombian military 
ranks and human rights abuses began to appear. Drug trafficking activity in the Caribbean 
is a regional problem that begs for the U.S. and Colombian militaries to cooperate. Drugs 
coming from Colombia and surrounding countries pose an external security risk in the 
United States and an internal security risk to Colombia, leading the two countries to 
cooperate. Colombia will need to make domestic headway in the war on drugs and ensure 
its own forces stay true to the Colombian government, not to the drug lords, by providing 
internal stability to the country. Likewise, the United States will need to continue to train 
and equip the Colombian military in Colombia to show its commitment and resolve to the 
drug trafficking problem. Plan Colombia provides a good formal institution to release 
funds to Colombia and outline how the United States plans to assist their Colombian 
counterparts, especially since Colombia could use those funds to fight internal instability 
created by the FARC. Military cooperation against drug trafficking in Colombia will 
need to take place at the source to prevent exportation. Once drugs find their way into the 
United States, it is already too late. The two countries should look to their past to see that 
they have common interests in the success of the Western Hemisphere, and that success 
came from key individuals, resolute documents, and rules. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS 
Why do two countries cooperate militarily with each other? What explains the 
variation in cooperation between the U.S. military and forces in Colombia and Mexico? 
Military leaders should want to know why we cooperate with certain nations and they 
should be concerned with how we achieve that cooperation. Culture, government, history, 
ideology, location, funding, reasoning, and policy are just a few of the unique variables 
that make countries different. Using IR theory to understand why two countries cooperate 
is just as important as knowing certain aspects of a country itself. For example, one could 
extract reasons that either helped or hurt cooperation efforts by looking at historical 
cooperation events. The evidence gathered from this research could apply to real-world 
cooperation efforts, would likely foster better relations, and create a better understanding 
of how to achieve common goals cooperating militarily. This thesis applied three generic 
IR hypotheses—liberalism, constructivism, and realism—to assess, analyze, and 
understand the variation in the United States’ cooperation with other countries, using a 
structured, focused, and similar comparison of two countries, Mexico and Colombia, and 
their relationship with the United States over time. Other case studies, comparing the 
U.S./Canadian militaries or the U.S./Japanese militaries, could be used, but Colombia and 
Mexico are unique as subjects of study because they are located in the same hemisphere 
and are nearly identical. 
This thesis found that there is a correlation with the IR theory of realism and 
reasons for military cooperation, as depicted in Table 5 and Table 6. Cooperation exists 
when countries share external security concerns, when mutual benefits exist because of 
economic ties, or when the internal instability of one country creates a reliance on 
another country. Cooperation remains low when there is no common external security 
threat, when two states perceive each other as a threat, or a country can control internal 
stability on its own. In Chapter II, this thesis found two specific reasons, based on 
realism, why the U.S. and Mexican militaries hesitate when tasked to work together 
militarily. First, U.S. military intervention in Mexico during the 1800s and the subsequent 
military conflicts between the two countries hindered cooperation efforts for decades. It 
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is very difficult to cooperate when you are at war. Second, the Mexican constitution of 
1917 specifically bans a garrison of foreign military units in Mexico. Mexico attributes 
this reasoning to its stance of wanting to tread lightly when it appears that its sovereignty 
may be violated upon because the world, in their eyes, is in anarchy and Mexico must 
look out for its own interests. In Chapter III, this thesis found two specific reasons why 
the U.S. and Colombian militaries continue to cooperate militarily. These reasons solidify 
the international relations theory of realism. First, prior to and during World War II, 
cooperation between the U.S. and Colombian militaries occurred to defend the economic 
interests of their respective civilian governments by protecting the Panama Canal from 
the Axis powers. Second, the Colombian military frequently allows U.S. military 
personnel into its country to assist, train, and equip Colombian forces in an effort to quell 
internal instability. Nearly every cooperative event starts with the two countries having a 
common external or internal security interest, respective individuals forming 
relationships or informal institutions, and solidifying that cooperation effort by 
establishing formal agreements and institutions. 
This chapter will analyze the reasons that best explain variation in cooperation in 
the U.S. military and Colombian military case study and U.S. military and Mexican 
military case study as it relates to the identified IR theories explained in Chapter I, and 
support those findings with historical events that either shaped or hindered military 
cooperation efforts. This chapter will identify a few takeaways that all three countries 
could use to promote and foster future cooperation against drug trafficking within their 
respective military departments, and end by recommending further research. 
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Table 5.   Analysis of U.S. Military and Mexican Military Cooperation182 
Realism Liberalism Constructivism Cooperation Reason
Prior to WWII Yes No No None
No cooperation existed.  Both countries were 
external security threats to each other.
WWII to War on Drugs Yes No No Low
Limited cooperation existed.  Both countries 
cooperated internationally against a common 
enemy, the Axis powers, but sovereignty 
issues along the Mexican border limited 
cooperation.
War on Drugs to 9/11 Yes Yes Yes High
Cooperation existed because both countries 
saw a need to combat drug trafficking.  Formal 
institutions were established to facilitate 
cooperation efforts, and civilian leadership in 
Mexico became more conservative and aligned 
with U.S. thought.
9/11 to Present Yes Yes No High
Cooperation exists today to combat drug 
trafficking, internal instability within Mexico, 
and regional security in the Western 
Hemisphere.  Institutions are developed, like 
the Mérida Initiative, to continue to facilitate 
cooperation.
Total: 4 2 1  
 
                                                 
182 Table 5 is adapted from Graham H. Turbiville Jr., “U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico: 
Uneasy Past and Challenging Future.” Joint Special Operations University Report 10–2. Hurlburt Field, 
FL: The JSOU Press, 2010. 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA516048; Richard D. 
Downie, “Critical Strategic Decisions in Mexico: The Future of U.S./Mexican Defense Relations.” Center 
for Hemispheric Defense Studies 1, no. 1 (2011): 5–35. http://chds.dodlive.mil/files/2013/12/pub-OP-
downie1.pdf; Craig A. Deare, “U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface.” Strategic 
Forum, no. 243 (2009): 1–12. 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA504170. 
 62
Table 6.   Analysis of U.S. Military and Colombian Military Cooperation183 
 
 
A. ANALYZING THE TWO CASE STUDIES 
1. U.S. and Mexican Militaries 
Mexico wants the best possible security outcome for itself as it relates to domestic 
or international security. Cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican militaries will still 
occur when realism is applied because the two organizations think reasonably and may 
share certain interests like combatting drug trafficking. However, that cooperation is 
likely limited to shared security goals between the two countries as Mexico continues to 
survive as a sovereign state under anarchy. Today, U.S. military and Mexican military 
cooperation continues to improve, in some ways mirroring U.S. military and Colombian 
                                                 
183 Table 6 is adapted from Dean A. Cook, “U.S. Southern Command: General Charles E. Wilhelm 
and the Shaping of U.S. Military Engagement in Colombia, 1997–2000,” in America’s Viceroys: The 
Military and U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Derek S. Reveron (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004); 
Bradley Coleman, Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939–1960 
(Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2008). 
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military cooperation because of recent agreements signed between the two countries and 
common external threats from the drug trade. For example, the Mérida Initiative, just like 
Plan Colombia, is a formal document between the U.S. and Mexico to provide funding, 
equipment, and military advisors to help stop drug violence in Mexico and near the 
Mexico-U.S. border. However, U.S. military and Mexican military cooperation will never 
be ideal because of historical events and formal institutions preventing complete 
cooperation. The Mexican people will continue to remember the U.S. military as invaders 
and push back at any perceived state sovereignty violations. In Chapter II, this thesis 
pointed out that the United States declared war on Mexico in 1846 after the United States 
forcefully acquired thousands of square miles of Mexican territory. This war declaration 
was far different from the United States declaring war against the Japanese during World 
War II. The United States did not intend to annex Japanese lands, but rather to push the 
Japanese back to their sovereign territory. In Mexico’s case, the United States used its 
military to push the U.S. border deeper into the heart of Mexico. Chapter II looks more 
closely into the actual events and battles that ensued. This encroachment on the Mexican 
people and the images of U.S. military forces moving from Mexican town to town 
continues to play out in Mexican storytelling today. 
Mexico guards its sovereignty with pride. There are very few instances in 
Mexican history that the Mexican government granted foreign military forces to reside in 
its country, most notably during WWII. U.S. military service members in Mexico serve 
as liaison officers at the U.S. Embassy. As pointed out in Chapter II, Mexico gave U.S. 
military units permission to fly in Mexican airspace and use Mexican port and airport 
facilities during World War II. However, Mexico passed a constitution in 1917 that 
prohibits a garrison of foreign military units within its sovereign borders. The reason for 
this is simple: Mexico did not want a perceived “occupying force” in its country in the 
1900s, and today, would rather receive military training and assistance, if it so desires, in 
the country offering such assistance. This precaution likely stems from the war with the 
United States and future cooperation will need to reflect on this document and tread 
lightly with their Mexican counterparts. 
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2. U.S. and Colombian Militaries 
The United States and Colombia have shared common security interests in the 
region. Proponents of realism argue that all states live under anarchy, and these two states 
share common economic interests and external security threats. Proponents of liberalism 
look past those competing states and theorize that the two states can establish institutions, 
change behaviors, and adjust policies to achieve common goals under anarchy. States can 
rely on individuals to put forth shared preferences and coordinate common interests. The 
U.S. and Colombian militaries have cooperated since the early 1900s when a common 
economic goal of protecting the Panama Canal was in the best interest of the two 
governments. The two countries did not share a common border that would have caused 
sovereignty issues. Neither country tried to invade the other country to amass more land. 
The two countries survived in anarchy and found ways to cooperate. As pointed out in 
Chapter III, the United States established a Caribbean Defense Command to prevent the 
Axis powers from sabotaging the Panama Canal because the Colombian and U.S. 
governments viewed the canal as a military and commercial strategic asset in the Western 
Hemisphere. This relationship first started out by military individual recognizing a need 
to protect such a vital asset in the region, a common external security threat from Axis 
powers, and eventually created an actual common formal institution, Caribbean Defense 
Command, that theoretically crossed the borders of the two states. U.S. military personnel 
and Colombian liaisons created the name for this command. 
Chapter III of this thesis gives example after example of U.S. military and 
Colombian military cooperation throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Most of this 
cooperation stems from U.S. military advisors training Colombian forces combating the 
drug trade. One key aspect of this training that differentiates itself from Mexico is that it 
occurs in the United States and in Colombia. Colombia allows the United States to station 
its military personnel in Colombia. There is a limit and Chapter III outlines those 
requirements set by Colombian law, but having foreign military forces, like the U.S. 
military, with you when you carry out missions against domestic criminals creates 
familiarity, cohesion, and trust between those units, and ensures a greater operational 
success rate. U.S. military officials were instrumental in establishing cooperation efforts 
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in Colombia. Chapter III discussed key individuals that used informal institutions, like 
military norms and social relationships, to promote cooperation. This eventually led to 
establishing formal institutions, like Plan Colombia, military schools in Colombia that 
mirror United States curricula, and other security cooperation agreements. Colombia and 
the United States share a common desire to reduce drug violence in Colombia, and stop 
the drug trade using the Caribbean sea-lanes of communication into the United States. the 
Two countries create policies to benefit the other, and Colombia trusts that the United 
States will not invade or occupy its country. 
B. CONTINUED U.S. COOPERATION WITH COLOMBIA 
The U.S. and Colombian militaries can achieve future cooperation by looking 
through the three IR theories identified earlier in this chapter. Proponents of realism view 
themselves living in anarchy where no one entity controls the will of all. Cooperation 
with other states only happens if it benefits a state’s own national security. Colombia will 
likely remain partners and cooperate with the United States so long as money from Plan 
Colombia, and training from U.S. military forces, continues. If Colombia views the 
United States as a competitor under anarchy, it will be more worried about its domestic 
issues, most notably arising from violent criminal organizations like the ELN and FARC, 
or TOCs. The United States is likely more worried about the movement of drugs from 
Colombia to the U.S. border.  
Proponents of constructivism would argue that a state cooperates with another 
state when good social relationships exist, both historical and current. U.S. military and 
Colombian military leaders continue to lead cooperation efforts by, first, establishing 
relationships. Events outlined in Chapter III continuously point out leader after leader 
expressing a need and desire to cooperate with the other country. Sometimes the civilian 
leader of that respective defense department initiates that relationship. Other times, the 
president of that nation calls on his counterpart to establish a good social relationship. 
Even when cooperation cooled, like during the drug corruption years, individuals kept the 
back channels open to discuss future planned cooperation efforts. Leaders today, like the 
current SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM Commanders, likely continue this tradition of 
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establishing good social relationships in Colombia to further U.S. foreign policy and 
national objectives through military cooperation. 
Liberal theory puts formal institutions and individual behaviors to better the two 
state’s outcome at the forefront of its argument. This thesis argues that liberal theory 
describes the main reason why the Colombian military and U.S. military cooperate. The 
U.S. government should continue to fund Plan Colombia and put pressure on other Latin 
American countries to assist Colombia in tackling the drug trafficking problem in the 
Western Hemisphere. More Colombian military personnel should train at U.S. service 
schools, and learn skills beyond weapons handling and combat maneuvers. The United 
States should outline these cooperation efforts in agreements and other formal 
institutions, and the two countries should work with their military representatives to 
reduce drug trafficking in and out of Colombia. 
C. ADJUSTING U.S. COOPERATION WITH MEXICO 
It can be concluded from the three IR theories identified earlier in this chapter that 
the achievement of future cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican militaries is likely. 
Realists would argue that states look after their own security in an anarchic world. They 
choose to cooperate with other states only if it enhances their own national security. 
Craig Deare states, “Mexico has five significant obstacles to overcome” if successful 
military cooperation is going to exist between the two countries in the future.184 The 
struggles likely stems from “the continued existence of two service secretaries rather than 
a unified defense ministry, inadequate budgeting for the military realities of the country, 
lack of properly trained civilian leaders to exercise effective policy control over the two 
secretariats, widespread mistrust of the armed forces by other federal agencies, and 
domestic political realities.”185 All of these reasons likely arise from Mexico deciding on 
what is right for its own national defense and security. The United States seeks 
cooperation with Mexico because it is trying to push security past its own borders to 
                                                 
184 Deare, “U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations,” 5. 
185 Ibid. 
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create a buffer zone. The U.S. military will need to work with the Mexican military on its 
terms, instead of trying to mold it into something that it is not.  
Constructivists would argue that a state would likely cooperate with another state 
when good social relationships, both historical and current, have been established 
between the two. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. argues that the U.S. military, moving forward 
to cooperate with Mexico, will need to recognize that “greater recognition of the Mexican 
military’s historical and current institutional sensitivities and national government 
internal restraints have led to approaches that are phased, measured, and in more accord 
with Mexico’s preferred go-slow stipulations than many in the past.”186 While the current 
relationship between the U.S. and Mexican militaries grows, the historical relationship 
continues to hinder full cooperation. 
Proponents of liberalism would argue that state cooperation balances on strong 
relationships between formal and informal institutions between two countries. Richard 
Downie argues that a future success in U.S. military and Mexican military cooperation 
would likely need to mirror the bilateral defense relationship of the United States and 
Canada, because it “involves a rich tradition of agreements and joint commissions, 
including a bi-national command, such as the U.S./Canada Permanent Joint Board on 
Defense, established in 1948; the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), since 1945; 
and the North America Aerospace Defense Command, based in Colorado Springs, CO, 
which is literally a two-nation command.”187 Strong formal relationships between the 
United States and Canada have maintained steady cooperation for years. For the U.S. and 
Mexican militaries to form such strong cooperative efforts, the two countries may need to 
rely on informal institutions until formal institutions built at the civilian level trickle 
down to effect cooperation at the military level. 
                                                 
186 Turbiville, Jr., “U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico,” 45. 
187 Downie, “Critical Strategic Decisions in Mexico,” 20. 
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D. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis looked broadly at the variation in military cooperation between the 
U.S. and Colombian militaries and U.S. and Mexican militaries. Further research could 
investigate relationships between U.S. Navy personnel and the Armada de Mexico, 
relationships between U.S. Army leaders and the National Army of Colombia, and 
individual relationships between corrupt Colombian military and Mexican military 
officers, and drug cartels, in their respective countries. Research on the number of 
Colombian military and Mexican military graduates of U.S. military schools since the 
middle 1900s, and reviewing data on graduation rates, etc., would also enhance 
understanding of this topic. Interviewing current and former Colombian military and 
Mexican military personnel who interacted with U.S. military personnel during their time 
in service would dramatically add to the primary sources of this thesis, give the reader a 
more personal touch to the topic, and may change the outcome of the correlated IR 
theories. Finally, further research linking political leaders from the two countries, their 
policies and ideology, and the actions of their respective military carrying out those 
policies would be beneficial. 
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